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With the demise of Soviet Union, the U.S. Navy found itself without an adversary that 
could challenge its conventional war-fighting capability. It sought relevance and had to 
decide where to accept budgetary reductions. Abandoning high-dollar weapon systems 
and accompanying tactics became a tough issue. Throughout the cutbacks, naval aviation 
remained at the heart of the Navy’s force. Naval aviation received support even though 
much of its capability outpaced all potential adversaries. Critics cite the cost of the 
aircraft carrier fleet relative to the missions the Navy now performs, and the steady 
improvement in anti-access weapons as reasons to invest in other technologies or 
decrease carrier numbers. Many now question whether the nation uses and operates the 
carrier force effectively. Nevertheless, naval aviation continues to provide the United 
States with a strong and creditable (although conventional and expensive) ability to 
accomplish America’s worldwide commitment and conduct contingency operations.  
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In August 2008, my crew completed the third from last arrested landing on the 
USS Kitty Hawk (CV-63), a ship that had conducted more than 400,000 similar landings 
since its commissioning in 1961. My squadron, VAW-115, flew the E-2C Hawkeye, and 
the squadron’s oldest two airframes entered service with the primary mission of 
conducting early air warning against Soviet aircraft, a mission that ended when I was in 
fifth grade. During the USS Kitty Hawk’s long life, many changes occurred to the 
strategic situation for the United States, but the U.S. Navy chose to support the aircraft 
carrier as its primary means of handling them. The long life span of naval aviation 
equipment presents both advantages in an extended return on investment and 
disadvantages in the possibility that technology, utility, or finical constraint might replace 
systems. Supporters and members of naval aviation labor daily to ensure that the ships 
and aircraft remain a critical piece of U.S. defense. The United States, however, has to be 
mindful not to let tradition and bureaucratic self-interest drive its decisions on what 
military systems to support, especially with such a large investment as an aircraft carrier.  
I personally saw the dangers to aircraft carriers in 2006 as an undetected Chinese 
Song diesel submarine surfaced behind the USS Kitty Hawk as it conducted routine flight 
operations. The submarine threat does not even represent the newest technologically 
advanced systems, like the Chinese DF-21D, that pose a danger to aircraft carriers. The 
large expense and hazards to naval aviation leave many to question whether it is all worth 
it. This thesis will explore how intuitional interest for naval aviation developed in the 
U.S. Navy prior to the Soviet breakup, how naval aviation retained its strong presence in 
the U.S. Navy after 1991, and attempt to identify many of the prevalent challenges that 
jeopardize the future of aviation. Ultimately, I argue that naval aviation and the aircraft 
carrier provide a service to the United States that no other technology or service can, and 
the nation should continue backing naval aviation in a manner that supports Combatant 
Commander requirements and U.S. worldwide interest.  
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A. MAJOR RESEARCH QUESTION 
With the demise of Soviet Union, the Navy found itself without an adversary that 
could match its capability. Along with the other services it sought relevance and had to 
decide where to accept budgetary reductions. Abandoning high-dollar weapon systems 
and accompanying tactics, around which entrenched institutional interests had developed, 
became a tough issue. Through the cutbacks naval aviation remained at the heart of the 
Navy’s core mission of strike warfare. Critics claim that the type of battles that the Navy 
prepares for and maintains a capability to fight resembles the strategic environment of the 
Cold War era. Why has the aircraft carrier and naval aviation retained its strong Cold 
War capability, and is naval aviation’s dominant role in jeopardy?  
B. IMPORTANCE  
The U.S. Navy’s tasks include patrolling the world’s oceans, contributing to 
conventional and nuclear deterrence for the United States and its allies, preparing for 
combat, restraining threats to the freedom of movement, fighting piracy, countering the 
drug trade, conducting humanitarian assistance efforts, augmenting land forces, 
protecting the homeland, and supporting operations for the Global War on Terror 
(GWoT). Naval aviation performs a considerable role in each of these missions. All 
military systems, however, have an opportunity cost, and determining if a systems price 
has become exceedingly exorbitant for the services it provides assist the military in 
remaining effective and efficient. An examination of why naval aviation retained its 
strong capability, without a major adversary at the Cold War’s conclusion, will attempt to 
delineate how naval transformation affects naval aviation and highlights how short-term 
decisions have long lasting effects on future capability. Looking at current developments 
and decisions that could possibly jeopardize naval aviation’s position assists the Navy in 
remaining a relevant and capable fighting force with the ability to meet the demands of 
the current strategic environment. The era of relaxed constraint on the military budget 
brought by the GWoT has concluded and transitioned into a controlled fiscal situation 
where aircraft and ship programs must fight again for their budget shares, much as they 
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did in 1991. When civilian and military leaders comprehend the actual effects that their 
choices have on naval aviation they can develop more effective methods to steer it.  
C. LITERATURE REVIEW 
1. Overview 
Much of the literature written about naval aviation concerns its largest 
component, aircraft carriers, and their future affects the vast majority of naval aviation. 
The literature supporting this thesis is broken into three sections. The first section 
explores how the Navy established of institutional interest in naval aviation. The second 
section analyzes how naval aviation retained its Cold War capability in 1991. It contains 
three subsections: retaining naval aviation’s capability after the Cold War, transformation 
in the military, and the influence of tactics and modernization efforts. The third section 
studies issues that may jeopardize naval aviation and contains three subsections: 
budgetary and political influence on naval aviation, adversary capability’s effect on naval 
aviation, and non-core mission’s effect on naval aviation. 
2. Establishment of Institutional Interest in Naval Aviation 
Since naval aviation’s crowning achievements in World War II it has undergone 
several periods that have presented challenges requiring military leadership to fight for its 
existence. These times illuminate the U.S. Navy’s strong institutional interest in naval 
aviation. Jerry Miller argues that the massive military drawdown and reliance on the 
capabilities of nuclear weapons at the conclusion of World War II threated the existence 
of naval aviation.1 Defunding would have occurred if Navy commanders had not revolted 
against civilian leaders in 1949 and staked the aircraft carrier’s role in delivery of nuclear 
weapons. Since then, naval aviation has remained at the Navy core. Miller explains that 
naval aviation remained generally unaffected in 1991 because it had proven itself in 
combat, and no one stood to question its role in national security. Its importance only 
grew when President George H. W. Bush removed nuclear weapons from Navy ships.2  
                                                 
1 Jerry Miller, Nuclear Weapons and Aircraft Carriers: How the Bomb Saved Naval Aviation 
(Washington, DC: Smithsonian Institution Press, 2001), ix, x.  
2 Ibid., ix, x, 182–83, 231, 246–49, 262. 
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3. Retaining Naval Aviation’s Capability after the Cold War 
At the Cold War’s conclusion, the U.S. Navy sought to find relevance without a 
major adversary. According to the CNA document The Navy at a Tipping Point, because 
the peace dividend of the 1990s did not change the strategic situation as much as 
expected the Navy kept much of its Cold War tactics, forward deploy state of readiness, 
and force strength.3 Naval forces and naval aviation remained in high demand from the 
Unified Combatant Commanders (COCOM), and it gained strength and appeased 
lawmakers through increased partnership with the Air Force.4 
The Navy has produced multiple grand strategies and guidance documents since 
1991 to provide broad direction to handle the changing strategic environment. The sheer 
number of published strategic guidance seems to indicate an attempt by the Navy to 
establish a definition of who is the enemy. Knowing whether naval aviation is the right 
tool for the job is difficult if the Navy does not know what the job is. Still, innovations in 
the Navy’s arsenal, especially the improvement of precision guidance weapons, meant 
that naval aviation could participate in more operations and provide a wider range of 
offensive capability.5 Even with an overall decrease of personnel and platforms the 
Carrier Strike Group (CSG) remained the prominent piece of forward readiness for the 
Navy.6 
4. Transformation in the Military 
Support for naval aviation raises important questions on the organizational 
behavior in the Navy toward naval aviation and the bureaucratic politics that support 
military programs. Has the Navy supported naval aviation in the matter it has because of 
thoughtful planning, threat analysis, strategic visions, and multiple presidential policies 
                                                 
3 Daniel Whiteneck et al., The Navy at a Tipping Point: Maritime Dominance at Stake? (Alexandria, 
VA: Center for Naval Analyses, 2010), 4–5. 
http://www.cna.org/sites/default/files/research/the%20navy%20at%20a%20tipping%20point%20d0022262
.a3.pdf.  
4 Ibid., 5, 14, 19. 
5 Ernest J. King, U.S. Naval Strategy in the 1990s, ed. John B. Hattendorf (Newport, RI: Naval War 
College Press, 2006), 6–7. 
 6 Ibid., 4, 30.  
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or did the bureaucratic politics of the Navy push for aviation’s prominence because it 
supported the desired culture of the Navy, and the Navy, frightened to lose any of its 
power and portion of the budget, acted to protect itself? One would hope that the answer 
is that grand strategic policy, established by the Navy with appropriate civilian oversight 
and meeting the threats of national security, sustained naval aviation. There are differing 
thoughts on how transformation and innovation occur in the military and who controls 
the decision on what programs to use to support and create strategy. Barry Posen believes 
that political leaders push military innovation from the top down with nonconformists 
from within the military, and the motivation for change will develop from the need to 
counter a threat.7  
Deborah Avant provides a counter argument. She states that policy set by civilian 
leadership is unable to make true changes in military doctrine.8 Military leaders will 
cooperate with civilian desires only when its increases their position. Civilian led budgets 
restrain military ambitions and control activities more when a division exists in civilian 
leadership.9  
Stephen Peter Rosen does not share similar views. He says that civilian leaders do 
not have control over innovation and that military leaders develop doctrine, but there 
exist different reasons why change occurs in peacetime and wartime environments.10 
During peacetime innovation is more possible, and the push for it will come from 
military leaders. Civilians are viewed as outsiders and can serve in a supporting role for 
the military member doing the change.11 Change will occur depending on how the 
international security environment is viewed. Wartime innovation will result from failure. 
Civilians do not decide on what technology to develop just how to fund it.12 If Rosen’s 
                                                 
7 Barry Posen, The Sources of Military Doctrine: France, Britain, and Germany between the World 
Wars (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1984), 13, 17, 233. 
8 Deborah D. Avant, Political Institutions and Military Change: Lessons from Peripheral Wars 
(Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1994), 74.  
9 Ibid., 130–31. 
10 Stephen Peter Rosen, Winning the Next War: Innovation and the Modern Military (Ithaca, NY: 
Cornell University Press, 1991), 1, 20–21.  
11 Ibid., 21. 
12 Ibid., 1, 20–21, 57, 255.  
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calculations are correct the U.S. Navy should guarantee that it does not wait until military 
failure to adapt the correct strategy. A collaborative effort from both civilian and military 
institutions could best determine the security environment. These three authors have 
differing views, but they all indicate that innovation in the military is difficult. The 
catalyst for transformation may depend on the strength of the leaders that are in place on 
both on the civilian and military side. The true danger occurs when the Navy’s assets and 
culture define the strategic environment.  
5. The Influence of Tactics and Modernization Efforts  
Some publications remark that the U.S. Navy’s effort to prevent anti-access and 
area-denial (A2AD) helped naval aviation. The coastal zone, where A2AD will likely 
occur, became acknowledged as the problem area in the 1990s. To counter such threats 
anti-submarine warfare (ASW) and anti-air warfare (AAW) progressed into high demand. 
The movement paid off in the Persian and Arabian Gulf operations, in support of land 
wars, and countering China’s possible aggression toward Taiwan.13 Instances like these 
keep naval aviation appealing to both military and civilian leadership.  
A2AD has also influenced strategic thinking. An opponent’s ability to limit air 
operations from fixed and maritime positions is viewed as one of the primary threats to 
the United States, and has led to the Air-Sea Battle Concept. Andrew Krepinevich argues 
that countries like China and Iran have increased their attempt to build effective A2AD 
mechanisms.14 He adds that the advent of precision-guided munitions (PGM), the Navy’s 
partnership with the Air Force, and incorporation of Tomahawk missiles on platforms 
like surface ships and submarines helped counter the threat.15 The tactics that the Navy 
supports as a part of its culture helped keep naval aviation prominent. 
                                                 
13 Geoffrey Till, Naval Transformation, Ground Forces, and the Expeditionary Impulse: The Sea-
Basing Debate (Carlisle Barracks, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, 2006), v, 8, 12, 
38–39; Ronald O’Rourke, Naval Transformation: Background and Issues for Congress, CRS Report 
RS20851 (Washington, DC: Library of Congress, Congressional Research Service, January 17, 2006),  
1–2; Ronald O’Rourke, Defense Transformation: Background and Oversight Issues for Congress, CRS 
Report RL32238 (Washington, DC:Congressional Research Service, 2006), 2–5.  
14 Andrew Krepinevich, Why Air-Sea Battle? (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and Budgetary 
Assessment, 2010), 1–2.  
15 Krepinevich, Why Air-Sea Battle? 1–2, 6–11.  
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Modernization efforts have also provided support for naval aviation and increased 
allure to civilian and military leadership. The amplified focus in the unmanned combat air 
vehicle (UCAV) aircraft and movement from single purpose platforms to easily 
upgradable aircraft capable of accomplishing multiple missions has aided Operations 
Enduring Freedom (OEF) and Iraqi Freedom (OIF).16  
These changes do come at a high cost. The largest example is found in the Navy’s 
pursuit of the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter (JSF). Jonathan Caverley and Ethan Kapstein 
identify the problems associated with the JSF’s soaring cost as well as the military pursuit 
of other all-capable equipment. They believe that smaller and cheaper and less advanced 
equipment can meet the needs of national security.17 Also they call for stricter political 
control over the acquisition and development process of defense articles.18 Although 
Caverley and Kapstein have valid points relating to many pieces of defense equipment, 
one could easily argue that military leaders have a better understanding of required gear 
for defense. Still, national defense suffers if the United States is in a state of financial 
crisis, which can result from overspending.  
6. Budgetary and Political Influence on Naval Aviation 
Budget reductions can have negative effects on naval aviation’s capability. The 
Chief of Naval Operations (CNO) remarked that cuts in ship and aircraft numbers would 
occur unless Congress ends the 14 billion dollar sequestration, which is currently 
                                                 
16 Guy M. Snodgrass, “Naval Aviation’s Transition Starts with Why,” United States Naval Institute 
Proceedings 139, no. 9 (2013), http://www.usni.org/print/27644; Thomas P. Ehrhard and Robert O. Work, 
Range, Persistence, Stealth, and Networking: The Case for a Carrier-Based Unmanned Combat Air System 





17 Jonathan Caverley and Ethan B. Kapstein, “Arms Away: How Washington Squandered its 
Monopoly on Weapons Sales,” Foreign Affairs 91, no. 5 (September, 2012): 1–2, 
http://search.proquest.com/docview/1034969006?accountid=12702.  
18 Ibid., 1–5. 
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constraining DOD funds.19 The expected result will be a loss of 25 aircraft and reduced 
training. Normally three CSGs and three Expeditionary Strike Groups (ESG) are ready to 
deploy with only weeks’ notice, but the sequestration lowers that number to one apiece.20 
Reduced manning has also impacted performance and overburdened personnel. The Navy 
may expect to see larger funding cuts as a result of losing the public’s support as the 
major focus continues to shift to fighting the land wars of GWoT.21  
Efforts to save money have pushed civilian leadership to adjust how the Navy 
buys new equipment. The RAND Corporation used calculations to examine the long-term 
effects that changing from four to five year procurement plan would have on the 
construction of aircraft carriers. Their findings indicate that on a five-year cycle the Navy 
will only have 10 carriers by 2040, and this number does not support current forward 
presence goals.22  
Not all political influences that hurt naval aviation are related to the budget. John 
Lehman studies the negative effects that occurred as a result of Tailhook 1991, the zero-
tolerance for mistakes mentality against military leadership, and pointless paperwork that 
has led to decreased job satisfaction and increased procurement time for new platforms.23 
7. Adversaries’ Capability Effect on Naval Aviation 
Captain Henry J. Hendrix argues that improvements in anti-ship missile 
technology, like the Chinese built DF-21D, have rendered the U.S. Navy’s aircraft carrier 
fleet irrelevant.24 Using cost effectiveness analysis he suggests that better options exist in 
                                                 
19 Michael Fabey, “Greenert Details Potential Fiscal 2014 Aircraft, Ship Cuts,” Aviation Weekly, 
September 05, 2013, http://www.aviationweek.com/Article.aspx?id=/article-xml/awx_09_05_2013_p0-
613509.xml#. 
20 Ibid.  
21 Seth Cropsey, “The U.S. Navy in Distress,” Strategic Analysis 34, no. 1 (January 2010): 35–37. 
22 John F. Schank et al., Changing Aircraft Carrier Procurement Schedules: Effects That a Five-Year 
Procurement Cycle Would Have On Cost, Availability, and Shipyard Manpower and Workload (Santa 
Monica, CA: RAND, 2011), xi–xii, 
http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/monographs/2011/RAND_MG1073.pdf.  
23 John Lehman, “Is Naval Aviation Culture Dead?” United States Naval Institute Proceedings 137, 
no. 9 (2011), http://www.usni.org/magazines/proceedings/2011-09/naval-aviation-culture-dead.  
24 Henry J. Hendrix, At What Cost a Carrier? (Washington, DC: Center for a New American Security, 
2013), 3, http://www.cnas.org/files/documents/publications/CNAS%20Carrier_Hendrix_FINAL.pdf.  
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unmanned drones and Tomahawk equipped submarines to contest anti-access efforts. 
Although Captain Hendrix acknowledges the diplomatic power that a CSG can have 
sitting off a country’s coast, he considers actions such as these the catalyst for China’s 
development of long-range anti-ship missiles.25 Captain Hendrix does make a cost 
beneficial argument, but he only focuses on China as potential adversary. There are many 
other countries that do not have the ability to oppose an operating CSG. He also does not 
cover aircraft carrier defenses and problems with over-the-horizon targeting for missiles 
like the DF-21D. Dean of Naval Warfare Studies at the Naval War College Robert Rubel 
shares Captain Hendrix’s view. He adds that a CSG can only function in an uncontested 
littoral environment.26 
Ronald O’Rourke takes a different approach when viewing China’s military 
buildup. His report sees a weakened U.S. Navy as fuel to strengthen China’s naval 
ambitions. He argues the need to improve defenses against countering weapons, like the 
DF-21D, instead of retiring naval equipment. The DF-21 is not the first weapon in the 
history of naval aviation to threaten it.27  
8. Non-core Mission’s Effect on Naval Aviation 
Some of the ways the United States uses naval aviation could decrease capability. 
RAND Corporation’s publication examined the combat and noncombat, traditional and 
nontraditional ways that aircraft carriers have supported and could possibly support 
national interest. It concluded that the United States will increase its use of aircraft 
carriers more often to provide non-core mission support.28 Captain Robert Watts 
observes the Navy’s involvement in the non-core mission of humanitarian aid as  
 
                                                 
25 Ibid., 3–8. 
26 Robert Rubel, “The Navy’s Changing Force Paradigm,” Naval War College Review 62, no. 2 
(Spring 2009): 15, http://www.usnwc.edu/getattachment/1f786f96-3e22-4b09-87ce-d24978893a15/The-
Navy-s-Changing-Force-Paradigm---Robert-C--Rub.  
27 Ronald O’Rourke, China Naval Modernization: Implications for U.S. Navy Capabilities, CRS 
Report RL33153 (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, September 5, 2013), 61, 70.  
28 John Gordon IV et al., Leveraging America’s Aircraft Carrier Capabilities: Exploring New Combat 
and Noncombat Roles and Missions for the U.S. Carrier Fleet (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2006), xiii–xvi.  
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detrimental to combat readiness. He questions the usefulness of aircraft carriers providing 
humanitarian support. He thinks the ships lose out on readiness, surge capability, and 
maintenance, which impacts the ship’s lifespan.29  
D. PROBLEMS AND HYPOTHESES 
For a weapon system to remain as relevant to national security for as long as 
naval aviation has, is a remarkable feat. This accomplishment, however, came at a high 
price. U.S. aircraft carriers and naval aviation are the most expensive military 
technologies in the world.30 The cost to operate a CSG for one day is $6.5 million.31 Still, 
President Bill Clinton’s question, “Where’s the nearest carrier?” is the same one that 
many U.S. presidents and COCOMs have made for decades at the outbreak of unrest 
around the world.32 Former Chief of Naval Operations Admiral Elmo Zumwalt (1970–
1974) commented that carrier aviation represented the principle military asset available to 
the president during the four crises that occurred during Zumwalt’s tenure.33 Despite this 
securing the future of naval aviation has not always been easy, and budget cuts and 
efforts to modernize the armed forces have targeted it.  
Are critic’s claims about the overpowered and expensive capability of naval 
aviation justified? The support and flexibility that naval aviation provided the United 
States during conflicts since the end of the Cold War seem to say otherwise. However, 
the choice to fund naval aviation, in the manner it was, appears to have occurred because 
naval aviation supported Navy culture, present assets, and institutional interest rather than 
a true threat assessment. The Navy’s rapidly changing strategic vision implied that the 
Navy wasn’t sure who the enemy was. Maintaining a strong strike capability, which is 
now supporting the Air-Sea Battle Concept and anti-access, anti-denial protection, held 
                                                 
29 Robert Watts, “The New Normalcy: Sea Power and Contingency Operations in the Twenty-First 
Century,” Naval War College Review 65, no. 3 (Summer 2012): 48, 57. 
30 Gordon IV et al., Leveraging America's Aircraft Carrier Capabilities, xv.  
31 Hendrix, At What Cost a Carrier?, 5.  
32 Bill Clinton, “Where are the Carriers?” Military, Global Security, accessed November 19, 2013, 
http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/ops/where.htm.  
33 John Lehman, Aircraft Carriers: The Real Choices (Washington, DC: SAGE, 1978), 5. 
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together the Navy’s core mission. Tactics required transformation to meet the needs of 
OEF and OIF, as the land war required a prominence of close air support. 
Naval aviation’s current modernization program, in every major platform, will 
position the U.S. Navy in an advantageous position to handle blue, brown, and green 
water conflicts. Still, innovation in new capabilities and threats persuade many to believe 
that critical pieces of naval aviation, such as the aircraft carrier, have become irrelevant.34 
The Navy must fully examine these dangers and focus on the true requirements for 
national defense. It is unlikely that the Navy will abandon the aircraft carrier. What may 
change is how the United States employs naval aviation and what types of missions it 
trains for and conducts. 
Manning, cultural attacks, non-standard tasks, core missions also effect naval 
aviation and bring many to question if the nation uses and operates the carrier force 
effectively. Some operational tempo and capability changes would increase combat 
efficiency. Aircraft carriers and naval aviation provide the United States with a strong, 
creditable ability to accomplish America’s worldwide commitment and conduct 
contingency operations, and naval aviation possesses advantages that other technologies 
do not. 
                                                 
34 Hendrix, At What Cost a Carrier?, 3.  
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II. ESTABLISHMENT OF INSTITUTIONAL INTEREST IN 
NAVAL AVIATION 
A. INTRODUCTION 
The U.S. Navy’s investment in naval aviation is just as important today as it was 
more than 70 years ago, despite growing trends to downplay naval air power through 
recent technological advancements. To understand the decisions made in favor of naval 
aviation since 1991, it is important to understand how the Navy’s institutional interest in 
naval air power developed. Although naval aviation’s successful legacy may not seem 
relevant to the current issues that jeopardize its future, the legacy does provide insight 
into why the Navy retained leadership support when hard budgetary decisions were 
presented. Also, administrative and budgetary decisions made during the distant past, 
such as the creation of OP-03V and ship construction plans, must be accounted for as the 
consequences still influence naval aviation’s modern role and structure. The long life 
span of naval vessels, for example, the 50-plus years for many aircraft carriers, requires 
the modern Navy to develop strategy that incorporates weapon systems bought under 
much different past strategic environments. 
B. PRE COLD WAR 
Prior to the attack on Pearl Harbor, December 7, 1941, the Navy primarily viewed 
naval aviation as a supporting asset for its primary system, the battleship. Quickly, the 
Navy’s opinion changed as the aircraft carrier became the decisive factor during the 
battles of Coral Sea and Midway. During the war naval aviation’s importance continued 
to expand, and by the end Navy doctrine relied on the ability of large carrier forces to 
deliver limited strikes in the opening stages of conflict.35 
The time period previous to the attack on Pearl Harbor can serve as a caution for 
the U.S. Navy not to neglect indicators of change. The Navy’s reliance on the battleship 
incorporated over a hundred years of tradition and passion from those who served upon 
                                                 
35Jeffery G. Barlow, Revolt of the Admirals: The Fight for Naval Aviation, 1945–1950 (Washington 
DC: Brassey’s, 1998), 6–8, 21.  
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them. In 1921, an aerial attack demonstration against a captured German battleship 
indicated that technological change might render these cherished systems obsolete. Still, 
the Navy relied on the battleship as its mainstay for another 20 years and only adjusted its 
viewpoint after defeat. Today, the Navy’s reliance on naval aviation continues as custom 
and passion have grown over the years. It is important for Navy leaders to see past these 
two elements and look at the factors of budgets, technology, and utility when objectively 
assessing if naval aviation is the proper weapon system to fund and support.36  
C. THE COLD WAR  
With the commencement of the Cold War the Air Force attempted to position 
itself and the atomic bomb as the centerpiece of the military. In the Air Force’s view, 
nuclear weapons supplied all of the United States’ strategic needs. As a result the Army 
and the Navy were both targeted for being irrelevant. In an effort to display unity with the 
other services, as Defense Secretary James Forrestal encouraged, the Navy did not openly 
contest the Air Force’s assaults. As a result, the Navy suffered a loss in public and 
political support.37 In 1949, Secretary of Defense Louis Johnson cancelled the aircraft 
carrier USS United States, which was already under construction, forcing the Navy to 
fight back. With the existence of naval aviation in jeopardy Admiral Arthur W. Radford, 
Captain Arleigh A. Burke, and Admiral Donald D. Griffen publicly revolted against 
civilian leaders. First, they attempted to attack the usefulness of nuclear weapons to fight 
conventional wars. This approach failed causing them to transition their efforts and 
position the Navy in a supporting role for the nuclear mission. The aircraft carrier 
provided an optimal nuclear weapons delivery platform because it eliminated the need for 
fixed bases, appealing to civilian leadership.38 The Navy preserved its commitment to 
naval aviation, and soon the nation would use its capability.  
                                                 
36 Robert L. O'Connell, Sacred Vessels: the Cult of the Battleship and the Rise of the U.S. Navy 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1991), 1–7.  
37 Barlow, Revolt of the Admirals, 63.  
38 Miller, Nuclear Weapons and Aircraft Carriers, ix, x, 182–83, 246–49; Lawrence Freedman, The 
Evolution of Nuclear Strategy, 3rd ed. (New York: Palgrave MacMillan, 2003), 27–28. 
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Within eight days of the Communist invasion of South Korea Navy aircraft 
conducted strikes against airfields, railways, and bridges.39 As the war intensified, it 
became obvious that the U.S. military was not ready for a conventional fight. Louis 
Johnson’s culling had not stopped with the Navy’s aircraft carriers, and now the United 
States needed to rebuild. Many historians believe that the decision to reduce the Navy to 
six aircraft carriers played into the Communist force’s decision to invade South Korea. 
The Navy began to see the cancelation of the USS United States as an opportunity 
to construct a much larger and more capable class of aircraft carrier. The result was the 
USS Forrestal (CV-59), which entered service in 1955. Its design solved many safety 
and operational issues and paved the path to the larger, more capable nuclear powered 
aircraft carriers.40 These changes supported the heavier advanced jet aircraft that the 
Korean War produced, and provided enough speed to outrun improved Soviet 
submarines.41 By the end of the Korean War naval aviation had flown 40 percent of the 
sorties, and carrier-based air compensated in many instances for the lack of territory for 
ground operating airfields.42  
After Korea conventional warfare took a temporary pause and the Air Force 
attempted its second attack on naval aviation in 1960 with plans for the Strategic 
Command, which would eliminate the Navy’s role in nuclear weapons delivery. Arleigh 
Burke, who was now Chief of Naval Operations (CNO), brokered a compromise with 
Secretary of Defense Thomas Gates to prevent the mission loss. The Navy also had the 
submarine launched Polaris missiles that defused the Air Force proposal. The 
development of the United States Strategic Command (USSTRATCOM) would not occur 
until 1992. Losing the nuclear role would have made the justification for large carrier 
forces difficult.43  
                                                 
39 John Winton, Air Power at Sea: 1945 to Today (New York: Carroll & Graf, 1987), 17.  
40 Miller, Nuclear Weapons and Aircraft Carriers, 184, 191–92; Lehman, “Is Naval Aviation Culture 
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41 Winton, Air Power at Sea, 63.  
42 James L. Holloway III, Aircraft Carriers at War: A Personal Retrospective of Korea, Vietnam, and 
the Soviet Confrontation (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2007), 441. 
43 Miller, Nuclear Weapons and Aircraft Carriers, 246–48.  
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In 1965, as the United States increased its efforts in the Vietnam War, naval 
aviation had a more advance aviation arsenal, due to the speed and range of 
improvements that had occurred since the Korean War. These advantages paid off in the 
1962 Cuba Missile Crisis as A-7 Corsairs provided photoreconnaissance of Soviet missile 
sites. Naval aviation provided some of the initial air attacks on Vietnam as President 
Johnson ordered Operation Pierce Arrow in response to the Gulf of Tokin incident. 
Throughout the war, naval aviation flew half of all sorties, and provided a more cyclic 
strike capability than Air Force attacks, which had to originate from a further distance in 
Thailand. 44 Competition, however, between the Air Force and the Navy over who could 
provide the most cost effective means of air support led both to exaggerated reports on 
the levels of effectiveness.45 Much as in the Korean War, carriers operated unopposed 
offshore, but they did not escape danger as three separate fires severely damaged three 
carriers and destroyed their air wings. 
Commissioned in 1961, the first nuclear carrier USS Enterprise (CVN-65) 
provided support in the Vietnam War that did not require constant refueling at sea. 
Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara, however, delayed the Navy’s plans to continue 
on a path toward an all-nuclear propelled carrier fleet. The two following carriers, USS 
John F. Kennedy (CV-67) and USS America (CV-66), utilized conventional power, under 
the belief that nuclear propulsion was not cost effective. With the commencement of 
construction on the USS Nimitz in 1968, the Navy moved once again toward nuclear 
propulsion until 1970 when Senator Walter Mondale’s quest to cut the defense budget 
specifically targeted nuclear aircraft carriers. Gaining support from others in Congress he 
introduced an amendment to halt follow on carrier construction. Senator John C. Stennis, 
namesake for CVN-74, provided testimony that helped remove the injunction, thus 
allowing the Navy to continue building. To handle construction and planning for carrier 
construction CNO Thomas Moorer created a staff group called OP-03V.46 During the 
                                                 
44 Holloway III, Aircraft Carriers at War, 184, 192, 247;  
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hearings “the OP-03V testimony in support of nuclear carriers became the basis of the 
justification for future carrier construction,” and it has stood ever since.47 The Ford and 
Carter administrations renewed pressure on carrier production as the Navy sought 
funding for the USS Theodore Roosevelt (CVN-71). The administrations’ principal 
argument pushed for Tentative Conceptual Baseline (TCBL) carriers, which were 
conventionally powered smaller vessels used mainly for vertical take-off and landing 
(VTOL) aircraft. To counter this argument the Navy conducted its own internal analysis 
in the Sea-Based Air Master Plan (1979-80) and the Sea-Based Air Platform Project 
(1981-82) that determined that the best path for naval aviation utilized large deck carriers. 
President Carter’s opposition deteriorated when the USS Nimitz (CVN-68) successfully 
met his tasking during an extended deployment and the Iranian hostage situation 
monopolized his time.48 
In the 1980s, the Navy decided to develop a collective maritime strategy to focus 
its efforts on power projection against the Soviet Union. The emphasis on nuclear warfare 
in the ’60s and ’70s had delayed this movement. In the 1980s, more military commanders 
began to believe that conventional arms could win the Cold War. The Navy elected to not 
participate in the shared Army and Air Force plan of Air-Land Battle, and it essentially 
prepared itself to fight the Soviets alone. The Soviets had constructed a formidable open-
ocean (blue water) navy in the 1970s that provided Secretary of the Navy John Lehman 
an opportunity to sell naval superiority as a crucial piece to victory. Emphasizing the 
importance of carriers and their strike capability, Maritime Strategy looked to take the 
fight to the shores of Soviet naval facilities. Enormous efforts went in to anti-submarine 
warfare to reduce the threat to carriers and improve aircraft capability.49  
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48 Scott C. Truver, “Now Hear This—‘Semper CVN!’ ” United States Naval Institute Proceedings 
139, no. 9 (2013), http://www.usni.org/magazines/proceedings/2013-09/now-hear-‘semper-cvn. 
49 Frederick H. Hartmann, Naval Renaissance: The U.S. Navy in the 1980s (Annapolis, MD: Naval 
Institute Press, 1990), 200, 212, 214–15; King, U.S. Naval Strategy in the 1990s, 18. 
 18 
D. PERSIAN GULF WAR 
The Navy’s strong ability to work independently resulted in a difficult time 
operating in a joint environment during the Persian Gulf War, leading the Navy to supply 
a mostly supporting role. Many of the problems came as a consequence of not 
participating in the Air-Land Battle Concept, and the Navy’s resistance to joint warfare.50 
Naval aviation proved that it could successfully work with the Air Force in Operation El 
Dorado Canyon in Libya 1986, which became a proud moment in naval aviation. In 
Desert Storm, however, the Air Force’s command and control systems had a more 
prominent role, which made Navy commanders envious. Naval aviation suffered 
criticism for a lack of sophisticated munitions and outdated equipment. One glaring 
example was the Navy’s inability to receive the daily Air Tasking Order (ATO) without 
physical copies being flown out to sea. Air warfare primarily won the war, and naval 
aviation conducted 35 percent of the sorties with six carriers.51 The precise munitions 
guidance systems and versatile aircraft that the Air Force utilized resulted in the 
legislative thought that technology could outperform higher levels of manpower. At the 
end of the war the Navy began to regroup and improve itself.52  
E. CONCLUSIONS  
Historical events have had a profound influence on the development of the Navy’s 
institutional interest in naval aviation. The support a weapons systems receives is often 
more important than the utility it provides when determining if government programs will 
continue. Policy makers tend to rely on methods that have worked in the past. However, 
previously successful policies become over used or continue to receive funding even 
when they do not properly apply to the situation at hand or strategic environment.53 This 
does not mean that naval aviation has reached the point where America should defund it, 
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or that modernization efforts cannot keep it a viable resource for the country. What it 
means is that leaders must comprehend that factors like passion can influence decisions. 
Some of the same augments made against naval aviation in the past return periodically, 
and the Navy uses many of the same defenses. The Navy should put more research and 
thought into future strategic needs and the Navy’s role in meeting them, considering 
budgets, technological advances and utility. 
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III. RETAINING NAVAL AVIATION’S CAPABILITY AFTER 1991 
A. INTRODUCTION 
In his recent Proceedings article Scott Truver wrote, “the Obama administration 
has remained steadfast in its decision to sustain 11 CVNs and ten carrier air wings and 
continue with the next-generation USS Gerald R. Ford (CVN-78) class-even in the face 
of excruciating fiscal cuts.”54 The current administration is not the first one to support the 
U.S. Navy’s commitment to naval aviation. However, after the Soviet collapse in 1991 
the Navy faced challenges in preserving support for expensive weapon systems as the 
United States reduced the size of the armed forces. Through the cutbacks naval aviation 
remained at the heart of the Navy’s core mission of strike warfare. Critics claim that the 
type of battles the Navy prepares for and maintains a capability to fight fit the Cold War 
era instead of today’s strategic environment. Meanwhile, successful employment in 
Afghanistan and Iraq and China’s rise in military power leave many thankful for the 
power that naval aviation possesses. The Navy’s well-established institutional interest in 
naval aviation, the Navy’s commitment to strike warfare and anti-access, anti-denial 
protection, the adaptability of its systems and technologies, and the bureaucratic structure 
of the government meant that naval aviation received support even though much of its 
capability has not had an adversary in many years.  
B. THE COLD WAR ENDS AND THE NAVY SEEKS A JOB 
As the Cold War drew to a close in 1991, the U.S. Navy, like the other armed 
services, sought relevance without a major adversary and had to decide where to accept 
budgetary reductions. Disputes arose within the Navy over how to structure strategy, 
build capacity, and what type of preparedness best provided security for the strategic 
environment. Abandoning high-dollar weapon systems and accompanying tactics with 
supportive institutional interests became a tough issue. Naval aviation played a role in 70 
percent of the crises that the Navy had responded to since 1972, creating a large amount 
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of reliance on its strong capability.55 However, cuts had to be made and carrier strength 
fell from 15 in 1991 to 12 by 1994. The total Navy ship number dropped by 125 in the 
same time frame.56 Naval aviation took the brunt of the 10 billion dollar defense 
spending cut in 1990.57 The Navy defunded a few of naval aviation’s costly development 
programs, such as the carrier based A-12 Avenger stealth bomber. Also, the job security 
provided by the nuclear weapons delivery role ended in 1991 when President George H. 
W. Bush removed nuclear weapons from all Navy ships.58 The Tailhook conference 
scandal made its way through naval aviation’s ranks costing the careers of 300 aviators. 
The Navy sought to identify America’s potential enemies and develop its force around 
the threat, but this was a difficult task.59 In addition, the United States collectively had 
difficulty determining who exactly the opponent that the nation should defend against 
was. The 1992 National Military Strategy, which the U.S. National Security Policy 
molds, expressed the necessity for the armed forces to handle unexpected situations from 
all over the globe with a decreased budget. It acknowledged that the new situation 
presented a more complex environment than the Cold War did, and emphasized joint 
operations between the services as well as a forward presence.60  
The Navy, considering Congress’s frustrations, increased its joint capability with 
the Air Force.61 The National Military Strategy’s demand for forward presence 
resounded well with the Navy because remaining combat ready through a forward 
deployed state had been its overall strategy since the 1940s. Carriers with an embarked 
air wing (CVW) fulfilled the forward presence requirements that COCOMs continued to 
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request.62 The strategic situation, which demanded high military involvement, did not 
change as much as the United States assumed it would, and the peace dividends of the 
1990s did not have as strong an influence toward stopping smaller conflicts.63 In fact, the 
Soviet’s had not responded to a crisis that the United States had acted upon since 1980.64 
C. THE INFLUENCE OF DOCTRINE AND TACTICS SUPPORTING 
NAVAL AVIATION  
1. Doctrine 
The document From the Sea was the Navy first attempt at developing post-Cold 
War strategy. It attempted to shift the Navy’s mindset “from power at sea to power from 
the sea,” in support of littoral power projection operations.65 One of its key aspects 
emphasized the need of naval aviation to support Marine land campaigns. Keeping with 
Navy culture, strike warfare would provide the majority of support for the Marines; while 
anti-submarine warfare (ASW) and anti-air warfare (AAW) remained in high demand to 
protect friendly forces as they operate in proximity to shore.66 Even though the Navy 
shifted focus toward expeditionary operations, it maintained many of its Cold War 
tactics, mainly strike warfare, which provided funding security for naval aviation. The 
Navy now would only have to provide protection in localized areas where a crisis 
emerged and not the entire globe. Many nations shared this movement to an 
expeditionary operations mindset, as the financial benefits were hard to pass up. Still, the 
Navy believed that maintaining strong naval diplomacy could reduce the chance for high-
intensity conflict. To ensure that this capability remained, the Navy accepted budget cuts 
in order to protect a 12-carrier force and boasted in its ability to operate independently.67 
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From the Sea would not be the Navy’s last attempt at doctrine development, and 
Forward From the Sea, the next edition, replaced it almost immediately. Since 1992, the 
U.S. Navy developed nine grand strategic documents, along with many smaller guidance 
whitepapers, to provide broad direction to handle the changing strategic environment.68  
 
U.S. Naval Grand Strategies 
1986 Maritime Strategy 
1990 The Way Ahead 
1991–1992 From the Sea 
1993–1994 Forward From the Sea 
1995–1996 2020 Vision 
1996–1997 Anytime, Anywhere 
1998–2000 The Navy Strategic Planning Guidance 
2000–2004 Seapower 21 
2005 The 3/1 Strategy 
2005–2006 The 1,000-Ship Navy 
2007–Current A Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower 
Table 1.   Naval Grand Strategies since 198669  
The sheer number of documents suggests that the Navy continually attempts to 
determine the most effective means to remain relevant. Knowing whether naval aviation 
is the right tool for the job is difficult if the Navy does not know what the job is. The lack 
of a specific mission or enemy may have allowed naval aviation to continue unquestioned 
because the threat of multiple scenarios remained. Still, naval aviation found repeated 
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support from the OPNAV’s Strategy and Concepts Branch (N531).70 The carrier’s ability 
to accomplish both kinetic and non-kinetic missions and an air wing’s ability to provide 
80–125 sorties a day gave naval aviation the support it needed to continue. The 1995 
strategy 2020 Vision once again established the importance of strike warfare to the 
Navy.71 The 1996 Joint Vision 2010, which attempted to provide the Chairman of the 
Joint Chief’s overall guidance for the services in the creation of the 1997 Quadrennial 
Defense Review (QDR), and the 2010 Joint Vision 2020 placed technological superior 
assets that could dominate a war zone, like air power, at the top of military capability.72  
America’s intervention in peacekeeping operations in the early 1990s had a 
profound effect on the Clinton Administration’s willingness to utilize armed forces. After 
failure in Somalia, resistance in Haiti, and non-involvement in Rwanda, National Security 
Advisor Anthony Lake remarked, “our armed forces primary mission is not to conduct 
peace operations but to win wars.”73 Repeated air campaigns occurred throughout the 
’90s in the skies over Iraq, and the Navy and the Air Force shared the mission. With 
foreign policy focused on crisis response and a renewed attention on economic issues, 
support for the Navy’s strike capability came from the fear of a resumption of war with 
the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) in the summer of 1994. After 
leaving the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) in March 1993 
the DPRK embarked on a quest to become a nuclear capable nation.74 However, the 
Agreed Framework compromise silenced these fears and naval aviation would not see 
major action until Operation Allied Force in Kosovo 1999. During that campaign, naval 
aircraft flew 3,100 sorties and accounted for half of all air support provided.75 
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Innovations in the Navy’s arsenal meant that naval aviation could participate in 
more operations and provide a wider range of offensive capability. The advent of 
precision-guided munitions, the Navy’s partnership with the Air Force, and incorporation 
of Tomahawk missiles on platforms like surface ships and submarines has increased the 
chance that COCOMs will ask for the Navy’s help to achieve their objectives.76 Captain 
Marty Erdossy, former commanding officer of the USS George Washington (CVN-73), 
believes that the national tasking on aircraft carriers provides the foundation to support 
large aircraft carrier numbers. The current congressionally mandated number of 11 allows 
the United States to deploy up to three carriers and maintain a surge capability for more 
carriers to support major operations. Six carriers deployed for the opening of Operation 
Iraqi Freedom (OIF). On a normal carrier cycle the Navy has “two deployed, one on its 
way, two underway for training, one in post deployment stand-down, two in-port for light 
maintenance/training, two in heavy maintenance and one in [refueling and over-haul] 
RCOH.”77 He adds that the need for carriers increased with the 2010 U.S. National 
Security Strategy’s substantial emphasizes on the pivot to the Pacific and the Navy’s 
current strategy, Cooperative Strategy for 21
st
 Century Seapower (CS-21).78  
In 2007 the Navy, in conjunction with the Marine Corps and Coast Guard, 
released CS-21 with great enthusiasm due to the extensive research that went into its 
development and its support for the 2005 National Strategy for Maritime Security, and 
the 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review. CS-21 emphasizes the six core capabilities of 
forward presence, deterrence, sea control, power projection, maritime security, and 
humanitarian assistance/disaster relief to achieve six key tasks. The tasks were to “limit 
regional conflict with forward deployed, decisive maritime power; deter major power 
wars; win our nation’s wars; contribute to homeland defense in depth; foster and sustain 
cooperative relationships with more international parties; and prevent or contain local 
                                                 
76 Krepinevich, Why Air-Sea Battle?, 6–7.  





disruptions before they impact the global system.”79 CS-21 does not specifically discuss 
naval aviation, or any other weapon system, and it does not challenge the standing 
institutions in each of the three services. Instead CS-21 emphasized interagency and 
global cooperation to combat both conventional and irregular threats. Specific enemies go 
unlisted in the document, and critics claim CS-21 is more of a concept than a strategy 
document.80 The Naval Aviation Enterprise produced Naval Aviation Vision 2010 to state 
exactly how aircraft would assist in the completion of each of the six core capabilities.81 
Hence, CS-21, like the many strategies before it, did not attempt to off balance the 
Navy’s states quo and naval aviation continued unaffected with once again established 
purposes. For naval strategy to damage naval aviation it would have had to promulgate 
strategic principles that naval aviation could not provide.82  
As a result of the September 11, 2001, attacks CS-21 called for the Navy to 
increase its involvement in the home security and defense mission, and called for a 
defense in depth approach where the Navy combats threats from forward deployed 
locations and U.S. territorial waters. CS-21 supports the concept of maritime domain 
awareness (MDA), which attempts to link federal agencies with both classified and 
unclassified information data sharing and increased cooperation. To ensure that this 
teamwork approach works the U.S. government established the Maritime Operational 
Threat Response (MOTR), which delineates how the U.S. Navy will work with other 
federal agencies if requesting or responding to assistance. Consisting of a manned watch 
floor, MOTR attempts to address the difficulties of interagency collaboration.83 This 
model has even emerged into a global idea to work with other allied nations. MOTR, 
however, does not assign command authority of one agency over another. The 
establishment of this concept means that naval aviation can provide assistance to other 
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agencies and participate in new types of missions. The system proved effective in the 
rescue operation of the crew from the Maersk Alabama when maritime patrol aircraft, P-
3C Orion, provided 24-hour reconnaissance support for the task, and their live video 
streams gave decision makers constant situational awareness.84  
2. Tactics 
Another large support for naval aviation originated from the emergence of anti-
access and area-denial (A2AD) fear as interest increased in littoral areas. CS-21 
specifically mentions this threat.85 The anxiety centers on an opponent’s ability to limit 
air operations from fixed and maritime positions, cutting off freedom of movement and 
the Navy’s power to respond to national tasking. Possible locations where this might 
occur are in the Persian and Arabian Gulf and the South China Sea. Specifically, China’s 
conceivable aggression toward Taiwan vexes the United States. Over the years, China 
and Iran have increased their attempts to build effective A2AD mechanisms. With 
China’s defense spending at approximately 150 billion a year, the Air Force and Navy 
decided to collaborate in the 2009 development of the Air-Sea Battle Concept (ASB), an 
idea modeled on the Air-Land Battle of the 1980s.86 The concept’s primary premise is to 
network and integrate joint capabilities to fight in all realms of combat (air, sea, land, 
subsurface, space, and cyber) and “attack-in depth” to overcome A2AD attempts.87 Naval 
aviation plays critical roles in accomplishing the ASB mission because it is less likely 
that other nations will be as willing as they were in the Cold War to provide locations to 
support land based assets. Aircraft carriers can easily position themselves where needed 
and eliminate the need to maintain foreign bases.88 China’s military rise leaves others to 
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argue that the threat extends beyond the littoral areas, and the United States may soon 
face an open ocean threat, which warrants a strong and capable force.89 
D. THE INFLUENCE OF MODERNIZATION AND ADAPTATION 
EFFORTS SUPPORTING NAVAL AVIATION  
The September 11, 2001, attacks provided the United States with a clear enemy 
and afforded naval aviation a chance to display its strong and improved strike capability. 
With a lack of land air bases in proximity to Afghanistan, naval aviation provided 75 
percent of the strikes (4,900 in total) and air support in the first three months of Operation 
Enduring Freedom (OEF).90 Attacking a land locked country hundreds of miles from the 
sea silenced many skeptics of naval aviation. By the time Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) 
commenced in 2003 naval aviation had demonstrated that it had improved its kinetic 
effectiveness from Gulf War deficiencies. Naval aviation gained praise from civilian and 
military leadership when it picked up the slack when weather prevented Air Force aircraft 
from supporting operations on a few occasions. In both wars six carriers surged to 
participate in the opening months, and displayed the utility of the carrier to conduct non-
core missions, as when the USS Kitty Hawk (CV-63) became a Special Forces staging 
area in OEF.91 
Naval aviation’s ability to provide its praised support for OEF and OIF was the 
result of many hardware and practice improvements that occurred in the 1990s and early 
2000s. New weapons like the Advanced Medium Range Air to Air Missile (AMRAAM) 
improved the capability of beyond visual range (BVR) air targeting, while the Low 
Altitude Navigation and Targeting Infrared for Night (LANTIRN) pod enhanced the 
ground attack capability of the F-14 Tomcat. In 1996, multiple aviation training and 
readiness commands combined to form the Naval Strike and Air Warfare Center 
(NSAWC) in Fallon, Nevada, which increased the standardization of tactics and 
techniques and further displayed the Navy’s commitment to strike warfare. Improving the 
Joint Direct Attack Munitions (JDAM) and introducing the Joint Stand-Off Weapon 
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(JSOW) and the Standoff Land Attack Missile-Expanded Response (SLAM-ER), meant 
that naval aircraft could increase its precision and effectiveness. Now naval aviation 
possessed the ability to attack in all weather types.92 In response to the 2001 QDR 
requirement, the Navy created the Fleet Response Plan (FRP), which changed the 
deployment, training, and maintenance cycles for aircraft carriers, and provided the 
ability to have multiple carriers available for operations OEF and OIF. The FRP doubled 
the amount of carriers available for COCOM tasking.93 
Adaptability in naval aviation also helped it stay relevant, especially in OEF and 
OIF. Much of this happened at the tactical level with junior operators taking the initiative. 
In one example the E-2C Hawkeye, which primarily delivers early air warning (AEW), 
air intercept control (AIC), and strike control, adjusted to fill gaps in the management for 
close air support and other new mission roles. Although an admiral approves the 
publication of Tactics Techniques and Procedures (TTP) and the TOPGUN manuals, 
which provide weapon system employment guidance, the majority of change submissions 
come from those gaining experience on the front lines. Other unclassified and classified 
community journals, such as the NSAWC journal, allow aviators a place to share their 
thoughts on improvements and experiences, which deploying units can utilize. Through 
practice, shared knowledge, and repetition naval aviation perfected the air kill chain in 
OEF and OIF.94 Thomas Ehrhard and Robert Work equate naval aviation’s success in 
improving range and sortie rates as one of the prominent steps that naval aviation took to 
increase its allure to civilian and military leadership.95 In 2010, an air wing’s ability 
could provide “1,080 aim points per day out to 200nm—nearly a seven-fold improvement 
over the 1989 air wing’s precision strike power, and more than 1.5 times better than the 
2001 CVW’s.”96 
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While OEF and OIF persisted naval aviation had to deal with the budgetary shift 
to other locations that fought the GWoT. As the insurgent campaign intensified the wars 
displayed, contrary to Joint Vision 2010 and 2020 documents, that dominance and air 
power on the battlefield cannot win every war. Due to Defense Secretary Donald 
Rumsfeld’s attempt to transition the entire military to match the post-Cold War 
environment, the Navy eliminated 50 programs and endeavored to transform its business 
practices.97 It canceled the F-14 Tomcat and S-3 Viking to free up money for other 
programs and modernization efforts, and it established the Naval Aviation Enterprise 
(NAE) in efforts to reduce operating cost.98 CNO Admiral Vern Clark placed emphasis 
on the ability of new programs to improve joint war fighting and permit growth in order 
to receive funding. Chairman of the Joint Chiefs Admiral Michael Mullen admitted that 
this created gaps in the Navy plan to recapitalize and modernize, and it hindered efforts 
for the Navy’s strategy Sea Power 21 goal of a 375-ship fleet. The Navy decommissioned 
the USS John F. Kennedy (CV-67) 12 years early in order to save 350 million in upkeep 
costs and 1.2 billion in operational costs.99 Naval aviation gradually moved away from 
platforms that provided single purpose roles to those capable of accomplishing multiple 
missions and being easily upgraded, but these changes came at a high cost. The largest 
example is found in the Navy’s pursuit of the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter (JSF), which has 
seen a 75 percent price increase since its initial 2001 estimate.100 
Officially established in 2004, the NAE attempts to improve squadron readiness 
issues through a better distribution of resources between deployed and non-deployed 
units and reduce the cost of flight hours for 3800 naval aircraft.101 It evolved from the 
findings of the Health of Naval Aviation (HONA) and Aviation Maintenance-Supply 
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Review (AMSR) and the success of the Naval Aviation Production Process Improvement 
(NAPPI) program of 1998. NAE comprises three cross-functional teams (CFT) of subject 
matter experts: Current Readiness, Future Readiness, and Total Force. It has successfully 
reduced gaps in COCOM request and forces delivered, and it has reduced the cost 
through saved maintenance man-hours and consolation.102 
E. BUREAUCRATIC SUPPORT FOR NAVAL AVIATION  
The bureaucratic structure of the U.S. government and the U.S. Navy also 
provides backing to naval aviation. Chapter II examined how institutional interest for 
naval aviation originated and how the Navy sustained it over the years. In subsequent 
years this trend of commitment grew stronger, and aviation became the dominant piece of 
the U.S. Navy. In a perfect system the Navy’s support for naval aviation, which the U.S. 
government backs, would result from thoughtful planning, threat analysis, strategic 
visions, and presidential policies. However, Mortin Halperin and Priscilla Clapp in 
Bureaucratic Politics and Foreign Policy propose that the Navy, as well as the other 
services, seeks policies that support the established institutional interest, which is set by a 
select group inside the organization and ingrained in the culture. Consequently, there 
exists the possibility for a weapon system to receive funding even when the strategic 
environment does not support it. According to their model, national interest can become 
confused with the pursuit of influence as the Navy fights for its portion of the national 
budget. Instead of strategic landscape defining what type of systems to fund to meet 
challenges, the select platform defines the threat.103 Roger Barnett of the Naval War 
College believes that culture is the most important internal factor for the Navy in the 
development of strategy. He says that the Navy ensures that the characteristics of strategy 
remain broad enough were each of the three major communities of the Navy, surface, 
subsurface, and air, continue to receive support. One could say that this critical dilemma 
could invalidate a doctrine like CS-21, except the Navy followed the guidelines of the 
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National Security Strategy, National Defense Strategy, QDR, and the National Military 
Strategy in the creation of CS-21, a system that flows from the President down.104  
Various models conflict when trying to determine the true source of military 
transformation and where support for a particular weapon system originates. The theories 
of Barry Posen, Deborah Avant and Stephen Peter Rosen are some of the most well-
known and put military leadership in competition with civilian leadership. Posen believes 
that political leaders push military innovation from the top down with nonconformists 
from within the military, and the motivation for change will develop from the need to 
counter a threat.105 Although Posen developed his theory based on the interwar period 
between the World Wars it provides insight into a possible reason why naval aviation has 
gone largely unchanged. Naval aviation saw no one contest its capability since no other 
superpower emerged after the Soviet Union collapsed. Avant provides a counter 
argument. She states that policy set by civilian leadership is unable to make true changes 
in military doctrine. Military leaders will cooperate with civilian desires only when its 
increases their position. Civilian-led budgets restrain military ambitions and control 
activities more when a division exists in civilian leadership.106 Rosen intermingles the 
two models and adds an extra element to the argument. He concludes that the ability to 
govern over officer promotions breeds power in the military. Rosen says that civilian 
leaders do not have control over innovation and that military leaders developed doctrine, 
but there exist different reasons why change occurs in peacetime and wartime 
environments. During peacetime, innovation has a greater possibly, and the push for it 
will come from military leaders. Civilians are viewed as outsiders and can serve a 
supporting role for the military member doing the change. Change will occur depending 
on how the international security environment is viewed. Wartime innovation will result 
from failure. Civilians do not decide on what technology to develop just which elements 
receive funding.107  
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These three authors have differing views, but they all indicate that innovation in 
the military is difficult. The validly of these three theories depends on the strength of the 
leaders in place, both in the civilian and military. In the case of Admiral Radford, Captain 
Burke, and Admiral Griffen in 1949 they remained committed to their cause and 
overcame civilian attacks on naval aviation.  
The strategic situation, as Rosen states, and the role of industry also provide input. 
Naval aviation receives a large amount of backing from a vast collection of powerful 
business and public interest groups, and they often provide financial backing to the 
legislators who support their interest. Not only do these groups influence the political 
dealings in Washington, they also impact the media, which informs and sways the public. 
For example, retaining a strong military capability to contest possible Iranian aggression 
is an agenda issue for one of the most powerful and donating groups, the American-Israel 
Public Affairs Committee (AIPAC), and naval aviation provides a large role in that 
mission.108 The likely source of support for naval aviation comes through a combination 
of the efforts from the various power holders. Graham Allison and Morton Halperin’s 
bureaucratic politics paradigm states that “multiple players holding different conceptions 
of the national interest struggle, compete, and bargain over the substance and conduct of 
policy.”109 The Navy likes to protect tradition, Congress seeks to protect its position in 
the government, and business protects their moneymaking systems.  
The fight over the V-22 Osprey, which the Navy views as a possible replacement 
for the C-2 Greyhound, provides an interesting case for the bureaucratic disagreements 
that can occur over military equipment and how powerful money can be. The Osprey 
program started in 1982, and differences developed almost immediately between 
supporters and opponents. Military and civilians comprised both sides of the argument. In 
August 1992, the George H. W. Bush Administration decided to drop its blocking of the 
program as it felt resistance from Congress. With backing from the manufacturers and 
U.S. Marine Corps, Congress kept the project alive through its control over the budget. 
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The manufacturers, Boeing and Bell Helicopter, subcontracted components of the aircraft 
to approximately 2000 companies in 40 states reaching a large pool of congressional 
constituents. Secretary of Defense Dick Cheney, with President Bush’s support, had 
opposed the program in previous years. His office, in order to save money, proposed an 
improved helicopter, rather than the V-22, and in some fiscal years did not spend the 
allocated funds, almost resulting in a lawsuit from the Legislative Branch. The Marines 
publicly pursued the V-22, often contradicting the Defense Secretary. Congress cited the 
V-22s ability to improve economic conditions in the United States, make a strong 
commitment toward the Marines and military, as well as provide favorable implications 
for civilian aviation. Congress often kept funding even when the program received 
cancelation notices and the Office of the Security of Defense (OSD) deemed it an 
unneeded weapon system. President Bush denied that his decision to back down from the 
dispute came from the proximity of an election year and stated that his constitutional 
authority did not support obstruction of the program. However, he did order the Marines 
to cease their public campaign for the V-22. Congress’ support pushed the program until 
the Osprey finally entered service in 2005.110  
There are also examples where the bureaucratic structure of the U.S. Government 
prevented the Navy’s attempt to cut unwanted systems. In 2009 Congress blocked the 
Navy’s request for funding of Littoral Combat Ship (LSC) and insisted on the funding of 
guided missile destroyers the Navy did not request.111 The Navy has tried to cut seven 
Arleigh Burke class destroyers every year since. The timing of the Navy’s request often 
influences the outcome. During election years Congress is less likely to anger businesses 
with dramatic changes to the defense budget. The Navy’s 2008 request to temporally 
drop to a 10-carrier fleet, while the USS Gerald R. Ford (CVN-78) was still under 
construction, did not get approved. However, the Navy’s attempt the following year 
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proved successful.112 Secretary of Defense Robert Gates failed in his fight with Congress 
to defund the alternate F-35 Lighting engine, reminiscent of the debate over the V-22 
Osprey. In January 2014, the executive Branch resisted the Navy’s effort to 
decommission the USS George Washington (CVN-73) half way through its lifespan. 
Although some speculate that the Navy’s proposal was just a ploy to appear to be tough 
on fiscal cuts and it knew the Obama administration would not approve.113  
If Rosen’s calculations are correct, the nation should heed the warning and 
guarantee that it does not wait until military failure to adapt to the correct strategic 
setting. Naval aviation has seen much success, but since World War II America has been 
able to pick most of its battles. One could argue that the United States undertook many of 
these actions because of the capability it possessed. The air campaigns over Libya and 
Bosnia serve as great examples. What types of battles did the nation not fight because 
resources were tied up in the supported weapon systems? What types of battles is the 
United States Navy unprepared for? The answers may very well be none. However, it is 
still important to ensure that an unbiased collaborative effort exists between both civilian 
and military institutions to determine the tools needed for the security environment. In the 
politics of Washington this task is easier said than done.  
F. THE UNTIED STATES USE OF THE MILITARY IN FOREIGN AFFAIRS 
The United States uses economic, diplomatic, and military instruments in foreign 
affairs, and there are many societal and institutional environment components in the 
United States that constrain and influence U.S. leadership in their national security policy 
decisions. Factors from the societal environment sway how the people of the United 
States view themselves and what values they stand for. Elements such as capitalism, 
religion, historical roles, philosophies, and difference of opinion over isolationism 
influence customs and national beliefs. A common goal among Americans is for the 
United States to remain the world’s only superpower. Meanwhile, the institutional 
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environment places constraints and counterbalances on the various components of the 
government and determines how the structure of the U.S. bureaucracy shapes foreign 
policy. Some of the largest factors that influence foreign affairs are Congress’ willingness 
to contest or agree with the executive branch and the president’s use of executive 
power.114 Policy makers rely on guidance established by traditions to deal with threats 
and determine the course of their policies. Politicians often enter office with many of 
these shaping concepts previously ingrained into their convictions. Both societal and 
institutional environmental factors affect the choices made in favor or against naval 
aviation. Using the military or displaying a strong defensive capability can resolve issues 
quickly and decisively state U.S. intentions for the world to comprehend. Over the last 
seven and a half decades aircraft carriers played a major role in both tasks, and naval 
aviation provided a critical role in supporting the nation’s worldwide commitment to 
allies, peace enforcement, freedom of navigation, and trade protection.115 
Much of the interaction that America has with the world and the effort it puts into 
combating threats depends on the mentality that it choices to take. Presidential policies 
play an enormous role in shaping the path in foreign affairs, as does the American 
psyche. The budget crisis and exhaustion from fighting two protracted wars in Iraq and 
Afghanistan has brought many to question the current forward presence mentality of the 
U.S. foreign policy Barry Posen advocates for a reduction in the United States’ 
commitment around the world. Like many others he believes that the strong military 
presence has made other countries dependent on America’s power and created as many 
enemies as it has successfully resolved situations. Instead of relying on the natural 
protection that the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans provide, the miniscule threat that Canada 
and Mexico pose, and nuclear weapons, America has decided to retain a “militarized and 
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forward-leaning foreign policy.”116 The result has brought diplomatic soft balancing, the 
attention of terrorist groups, the creation of alliance against America, and the 
proliferation of weapons technologies from countries like China and Russia to smaller 
nations trying to fill the gap in capability with the United States. Moreover, the United 
States often involves itself in crisis that have nothing to do with America’s national 
security. A military scale down would save capital and possibly put the United States in a 
more advantageous position in the world.117 The Cato Institute estimates that a savings of 
$900 billion could result from a ten-year major reduction in military capability and 
posture. Posen does not believe in a full pull back of forces. Instead he calls for a 
reexamination of America’s commitments.118  
Others propose for the continuation of substantial forward engagement and 
maintenance of the strong defense relationships the United States has with partner nations 
spread all over the globe. Every administration since World War II supported 
engagement through economic, diplomatic, and military means under the belief that 
maintaining ties, balances potential opponents. Authors Stephen Brooks, John Ikenberry 
and William Wohlforth argue that the primary objective in the United States strong 
defensive posture after the Soviet Union’s collapse is to secure regional stability. Efforts 
to restructure of the defense budget are already underway with the goal of decreasing 
defense spending within the U.S. budget from 4.5 percent to 3 percent by 2017.119 
Brooks, Ikenberry and Wohlforth disagree with Posen stating that little evidence exists of 
anti-American coalitions. Instead, they argue that alliances strengthen the country, avoid 
wars, and deter potential opponent’s ambitions. Without these alliances and preservation 
of commitments, Asia, the Middle East, and possible Europe would destabilization. 
Countries that benefit from extended deterrence would likely develop nuclear arsenals 
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and sea-lanes used for shipping might become jeopardized. America’s military presence 
ensures the establishment and continuation of free trade agreements with countries like 
South Korea. Because of America’s strength, which naval aviation provides a large 
portion of, the world is a safer place, and America’s economy flourishes. The authors are 
not blind to the monetary burden of a robust military and see the reduction in defense 
spending since 1991 as a positive. They also believe in rebalancing, but not abandonment 
to the worldwide commitment the United States has made.120  
Under President Obama’s administration the United States remains committed to 
interaction with the world and maintenance to America’s commitments, and the military 
and naval aviation routinely play a major tool in foreign affairs. For now, only a minority 
of political leaders believes in an abandonment of these pledges or a move in line with 
Posen’s theories, and the military’s most expensive tool, aircraft carriers, receives the 
support it needs to continue.  
G. CONCLUSIONS  
As the Navy devotes 8.7 percent of its 156 billion dollar budget on the 
construction of the USS Gerald R. Ford (CVN-78), its commitment to naval aviation is 
well displayed.121 Institutionally naval aviation has played an integral part of the Navy 
since World War II, and its ability to project power for strike warfare and A2AD 
missions assists in it receiving continued support. The adaptability of naval aviation’s 
members to accomplishing mission tasking, and the Navy’s commitment to constantly 
upgrading its systems and technologies has resulted in naval aviation outpacing potential 
enemy capability for many years. As the defense budget continues to receive increased 
scrutiny, unmanned systems advance in capability, and anti-aircraft carrier weaponry 
improves it is likely that naval aviation will continue to undergo dramatic changes. A 
serious reduction in naval aviation would go against the current bureaucratic structure of 
the government, deal a large blow to businesses, and hinder the COCOMs ability to meet 
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the strategic defensive guidance as it is written today. The future of naval aviation 
depends on the decisions made over issues that jeopardize its ability to continue to meet 
the security needs of the United States.  
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IV. ISSUES THAT JEOPARDIZE NAVAL AVIATION 
A. INTRODUCTION  
Although specific aircraft systems have issues within naval aviation this chapter 
will focus on those dealing with the aircraft carrier, because the condition and health of 
the carrier fleet affects the majority of naval aviation. In an opinion paper arguing against 
the reduction of naval aviation Rear Admiral Michael Manazir wrote, “The aircraft 
carrier … and its embarked air wing remain arguably the most valuable and effective 
instrument for shaping the national military strategy, with proven applicability from 
humanitarian assistance and disaster relief to high-end maritime strike warfare.”122 His 
statement is part of an ongoing debate concerning the current status of naval aviation 
where critics cite the cost of the carrier fleet, force composition, alternatives, utility, and 
vulnerabilities as reasons to invest in other technologies or decrease carrier numbers. 
Arguments over the Navy’s carrier structure are not the only difficulties that jeopardize 
the future of naval aviation. Manning, cultural attacks, non-standard tasks, core missions 
also effect aircraft carriers and bring many to question if the nation uses and operates the 
carrier force effectively. While some operational tempo and capability changes would 
increase efficiency, aircraft carriers provide the United States with a strong, creditable 
ability to accomplish America’s worldwide commitment and conduct contingency 
operations, and naval aviation possesses advantages that other technologies do not. 
B. NAVAL AVIATION’S BUDGETARY AND POLITICAL CHALLENGES 
Aircraft carriers cost more than just the initial $13 billion construction price. The 
support equipment, Air Wing, and vessels required to protect one carrier total 
approximately $50 billion.123 Subsequently, the United States pays 6.5 million dollars per 
day to operate a single CSG.
124
 To facilitate the enormous operational demands of aircraft 
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carriers the Navy dedicates 46 percent of all naval personnel to support them.
125 
Costs 
have risen over the years. For example the construction price of the USS Nimitz (CVN-
68) in 1976 ran $950 million, which represented 4.5 percent of the Navy’s $21 billion 
dollar annual budget. The USS Gerald R. Ford (CVN-78) will consume an estimated 
12.5 billion, which is 8.7 percent of the Navy’s 156 billion dollar budget.126 These facts 
bring an increased level of scrutiny from critics, especially in times when defense 
spending is under fire. The resulting political fight affects the Navy’s ability to 
effectively operate.  
The hefty budgetary support that the Defense Department received during OEF 
and OIF has come to a close, and the new round of reductions can have negative effects 
on the Navy’s capability, including naval aviation. The Budget Control Act of 2011 
elevated the search for military wide spending cuts, and the Navy has taken reductions in 
all of its communities.127 From the surface fleet the Navy removed 11 cruisers from 
deployment cycles for modernization efforts after Congress blocked decommissioning 
plans. Budgetary adjustments also abbreviated the purchase of Littoral Combat Ships 
(LCS) from 52 to 32 vessels, and a two-year delay for the F-35 is still on the discussion 
table.128 One of the principle budgetary hardships for the Navy is the sequestration. Chief 
of Naval Operations Admiral Jonathan Greenert remarked that cuts to ships and aircraft 
numbers and training would continue unless Congress ends the sequestration. Normally, 
three CSGs and three Expeditionary Strike Groups (ESG) can surge deploy with only a 
weeks’ notice, but the sequestration lowered that number to one apiece.129 Defense 
Secretary Chuck Hagel’s attempt to cut Navy resources came under intense scrutiny from 
the Legislative Branch. Congress’s willingness to approve cuts lowers during an election 
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year as representatives become sensitive to the negative voting implications from defense 
businesses and interest groups, just as seen in the case of the V-22 Osprey. 
1. Reductions or Elimination of the Carrier Fleet 
One of the primary methods some civilian and military policy makers propose to 
shrink the Navy’s budget is through a reduction or elimination of the carrier fleet. A 
complete elimination of the carrier fleet would require a major legislative re haul, but if 
the sequestration continues, the plan is to defund the nuclear refueling of the USS George 
Washington (CVN-73). The DOD delayed the decision until the 2016 budget after 
Congress reacted negatively to the proposition to cut the carrier early.130 Once again an 
electron year may have kept the Navy from suffering an early negative verdict. The Navy 
did endorse the elimination, but Julian Barnes of the Wall Street Journal believes that the 
Navy may have been trying to appear tough on spending cuts while knowing that 
Congress would not support the effort.131 If true, actions like these could prove risky, as 
the Legislative Branch has conceded power at times to the Executive Branch. Although, 
if a reduction decision occurred interest groups would contest the president just as hard as 
they would Congress. Critics of the current carrier fleet state that the United States could 
decommission two carriers and still have more than the combined seven other nations 
that maintain a carrier. Four Washington based think tanks propose that supporting an 
enhanced submarine fleet can meet the nation’s strategic interest better.132 At a February 
2014 speech Vice CNO Mark Ferguson noted that the top budgetary priority would 
transition in the coming years from the revitalization of naval aviation to the replacement 
for the Ohio Class nuclear ballistic submarine (SSBN-X).133 
Serious negative effects might occur from a reduction in carrier numbers, mainly 
operational tempo (OPTEMPO). Without a change in national will, worldwide 
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commitment COCOM requirements, and doctrine, deployment times would have to 
increase for the remaining vessels. Increased deployment times elevate crew risks and 
morale and impact retention rates in some of the most critical occupations.134 In one 
example, Deputy Chief of Naval Operations (Manpower, Personnel, Training and 
Education) Vice Admiral William Moran expressed concern after the USS Carl Vinson 
(CVN-70) conducted two back-to-back lengthy deployments with only five and a half 
months in-between, leading to a zero retention rate in the reactor department officer 
wardroom, a department requiring expensive specialized training.135 The USS Carl 
Vinson (CVN-70) is not alone. 2012 marked the busiest year for OPTEMPO in the U.S. 
Navy.136 If the Navy loses the USS George Washington (CVN-73) to sequestration, 
when it is scheduled to come back online, in 2021, the remaining ten ships will have to 
conduct nine or ten-month deployments. RCOH will take another carrier out of the 
deployment cycle for up to 44 months. Commander U.S. Fleet Forces Admiral William 
Gortney said, “I think eight months is the ragged edge of what sailors and families will 
be able to hold onto.”137 With the deployment cycle of an 11-carrier fleet already 
negatively affecting retention rates a reduction would make matters worse. Air wing and 
surface training and maintenance cycles require time in-between deployments to maintain 
combat effectiveness. Air wings can only accomplish some specialized training at 
facilities in the United States, like the Fallon Nevada Range. Since 1991 the number of 
carriers required by Congress for Major Combat Operations (MCOs) has fallen from 15 
to 12 to 11 and now 10 until USS Gerald R. Ford (CVN-78) is online. This reduction is 
done to save money, taking a risk that many military leaders believe is not worth taking. 
When compiling long deployments with assaults on pay and benefits, a zero defect  
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mentality, unknown schedules, constant material and money disputes, and a recovering 
economy and airline industry, the Navy stands the chance of losing many of its highly 
trained/experienced warfighters.138 
In response to the current problem of extended deployments the Navy developed a 
36 month Optimized Fleet Response Plan (O-FRP). It attempts to establish one eight-
month deployment schedule with the goal of increasing Navy personnel’s home time 
from 49 percent to 68 percent.139 The O-FRP also attempts to increase predictability over 
readiness and deployment cycles and train the carrier’s components (air wing, carrier, and 
surface escorts) to one combined and coordinated standard. Critics argue, however, that a 
guaranteed eight-month deployment followed by a 14 months window in which a CSG 
can surge (and if the past decade is a measure, it will) will not solve any of the Navy’s 
issues and appears to be a continuation of an high OPTEMPO that will negatively affect 
retention in the most highly qualified individuals.140  
Some military commanders voice concern over the ability of 11 aircraft carriers to 
accomplish the nation’s worldwide tasking, and a reduction would only complicate 
matters. Commander, U.S. Pacific Command Admiral Samuel Locklear expressed his 
anxieties to the House Armed Services Committee that CENTCOM and PACCOM have 
difficulty meeting strategic requirements now and cannot afford an even greater loss. He 
cited the possibility of contingencies on and in the Korean Peninsula, the South China 
Sea, and the Philippines as reasons to support the fleet. Many operational plans (OPLAN) 
utilize the aircraft carrier in critical roles. He believes that the quick response surge 
capability will diminish even greater with more cuts.
141
 Up to six carriers, including 
many that surged, deployed to support the opening strikes in Afghanistan and Iraq. To 
lighten the Navy’s load the United States could increase cooperation with allied nations 
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and more evenly divide responsibilities between militaries. The 2014 QDR mentions 
efforts to assist the United Kingdom in the rekindling of it carrier program.142 Getting 
allied countries, which routinely freeload on U.S. defense, to take a more equal role in 
regional protection might be a difficult task, and many U.S. Citizens and representatives 
may not like the idea of our security being in the hands of other nations.  
2. Manning and Bureaucracy Issues 
Attempts to reduce the cost of the carrier fleet do not always target the vessels. 
For years the Navy has operated with reduced manning, expecting the remaining 
personnel to pick up the slack. To retain its high deployment rate the Navy had to change 
the fleet response plan (FRP) and personal tempo (PERSTEMPO) requirements and 
doubled the amount of forward deployed forces.143 With the budget crisis, force 
management tools like Perform to Serve (PTS), and sequestration targeting manning, the 
problem could get worse. With the drawdown of OEF and OIF there is some relief as the 
over 11,000 sailors supporting those operations in augmentee roles rejoin their units. 
Manning shortages influence a CSG’s ability to conduct operational tasking effectively 
and safely.144  
Not all political influences that hurt naval aviation relate to the budget. Some 
legislative members and the growing bureaucracy of the Navy have changed the culture, 
reporting requirements, and responsibilities of naval aviation thus affecting the combat 
effectiveness of a CVW. Former Secretary of Navy John Lehman sees the disciplinary 
investigation that resulted from the 1991 Tailhook conference, led by Patricia Schroeder 
(D-CO), as the major catalyst for a deterioration of the culture of naval aviation. The 
inquiry cost 300 carrier aviators their jobs, and many lost their career for only 
attending.145 He views the lessons passed down from mishaps, mistakes, and flying and 
combat experience as a major building block of warfighting skills. Officer’s Clubs 
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around the world provided junior officers a relaxed environment to learn from the 
proficiency of older generations. Many of these clubs have now closed with attempts to 
de-glamorization the use of alcohol and from the fears of officers having to always watch 
what they say and do as a zero-tolerance for mistakes mentality spread throughout the 
military. Although, positive effects emerged with decreased DUI and alcoholism rates, 
officers today can expect to lose their careers for making one mistake on or off duty. 
When this occurs the Navy loses a highly qualified officer that it invested millions to 
train. One of the Navy’s greatest leaders Admiral Chester Nimitz grounded a squadron of 
destroyers and did not lose his job because his chain of command protected him. 
Currently, senior officers have little leeway to afford such help, and if this incident 
occurred today Admiral Nimitz would likely find himself on the front cover of the Navy 
Times. Secretary Lehman also argues that pointless paperwork has led to decreased job 
satisfaction, which pushes out some of the most talented aviators and increases 
procurement time for new platforms. In the 1950s the Navy successfully deployed the 
Polaris Missile submarine from initial concept in four years. Today the Navy projects the 
F-35 Lighting will take 24 years to reach the fleet. Other problems, such as the DOD’s 
mounting bureaucratic responsibilities, increased the number of administrative jobs from 
50 billets in 1947 to 750,000 today; the military created 250 new Joint Task Force billets 
to support the Goldwater-Nichols Act of 1986’s requirement of joint staff duty.146 A 
squadron must produce 780 different reports to the pentagon annually to feed the 
establishment, which takes time away from combat training.147 There are efforts to 
reverse the paperwork drill. In one example the DOD recently requested that Congress 
eliminate the need for yearly long-term aircraft procurement plans and only require it 
every four years. The Fy-12 aircraft plan cost $440,056 to produce. The QDR, annual 
budget, and routine testimonies to Congress state most of the military’s goals, thus 
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making the yearly procurement plan one of many redundancies.148 Combined, these 
issues slowly chip away at the skills, health, and morale of a carrier force.  
3. Adjusting Carrier Procurement Cycles  
Efforts to save money in aircraft carriers have also pushed leadership to adjust 
how the Navy buys new equipment through a purchasing phase increase. One RAND 
Corporation’s report examines the long-term effects on the construction of aircraft 
carriers if a proposed Navy procurement plan changes from a four to a five-year cycle. Its 
findings indicate that on a five-year cycle the Navy will have only 10 carriers by 2040.149 
If the current MCO remains at 11 carriers, the Navy will not have enough to support 
forward presence goals. Adjusting the schedules could also increase the cost for future 
carriers CVN-79 and CVN-80 up to 15 percent, decrease shipyard work demand, and 
increase RCOH as much as six percent.150  
Another RAND team suggests an expedited replacement schedule of USS Nimitz 
class carriers with the USS Gerald R. Ford class could bring down the operational cost of 
maintain a CSG and provide 30 percent increase in capability to the Navy.151 Under the 
Navy’s current plans half of the carrier fleet will consist of aging Nimitz class carriers in 
2035. These older systems use 46-year-old technology and require an expensive three-
year RCOH after 23 years. While many improvements, such as a bulbous bow on the 
USS Ronald Reagan (CVN-76), benefit flight operations, Ford class carriers reduce 
personnel and maintenance requirements thus promoting a lower operating cost through 
improved propulsion, enhanced munitions handling, and transformed hydraulic systems 
to electromagnetic technology.152 
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C. CHALLENGES POSED TO AIRCRAFT CARRIERS BY OTHER U.S. 
WEAPONS 
1. Utilize Smaller Carriers  
Naval aviation’s reluctance to use less expensive smaller carriers presents another 
debate that threatens the large deck super carrier fleet. Naval aviation moved away from 
escort carriers in the early stages of the Cold War due to threats from Soviet Union 
submarines.153 U.S. Marine Corps aviation does use 11 smaller, 40,000-ton amphibious 
assault carriers, which the Navy operates for them. These carriers carry a significantly 
reduced aircraft inventory, but they only cost $2 to $3.4 billion apiece, depending on the 
variant.154 The newest USS America class will increase the aircraft capability slightly 
with the arrival of the F-35B JSF short take-off vertical landing (STOVL). The obvious 
advantages of smaller carriers is the ability of the United States to either build more for 
the same cost as one larger carrier, or have a few fulfill gaps if the Navy decreases its 
mandate of 11 super carriers. Some claim that with increase in technology, such with the 
growth of unmanned systems and more capable manned airframes, smaller carriers will 
provide the strategic air power at sea needs that the nation requires. Having multiple 
carriers in different locations appears appealing in scenarios like war with China or if 
multiple contingencies erupt in geographically separated areas.155 
However, the use of smaller carriers for naval aviation does not support current 
naval doctrine. For a 40,000-ton carrier to properly meet worldwide COCOM 
requirements aircraft technology must increase dramatically to the level of the 
capabilities of a super carrier, as well as make up for the limited amount of aircraft. The 
advantage that the F-35B JSF STOVL, which the Marine Corps will operate from smaller 
carriers, produces with increased stealth, link, and detection makes it a more proficient 
fighter but not enough for a doctrinal change.156 Range and weight restrictions are only a 
few of the issues. An air wing’s composition includes more than just strike fighters and a 
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CVW works as a team. The E-2C Hawkeye provides AEW and command and control, 
and either the EA-6B Prowler or the EA-18G Growler provide electronic attack and 
support; both aircraft require large deck carriers for operation. While unmanned systems 
may one day provide these functions, the technology is in its infancy. Big deck carriers 
also provide more flexible choices in flight operations. Some aircraft undergo 
maintenance in the hanger bay, some prep for missions or rearmament, while others 
conduct flight operations at the same time. To accomplish the Navy’s core mission of 
strike warfare, it takes a lot of aircraft to execute a sustained mission presence over an 
area. One carrier normally conducts cyclic flight operations for 12 hours, launching 
approximately 120 sorties executing a wide range of missions. Navy aircraft flew 400 
miles inland from the Arabian Sea before reaching the combat zone to participate in OEF 
and could only accomplish this task with a steady stream of planes. The use of two small 
MHS Invincible class carriers hindered the amount of tasks that 28 VSTOL British AV-8 
Harriers could conduct in Falkland Island war, and a lack of AEW aircraft limited the 
AV-8 tactics and provided the Argentinian air force an advantage attacking British 
vessels with Exocet missiles.157 Finally, smaller carriers face the same adversarial 
challenges that larger carriers do, as any type of surface carrier has a large radar cross 
section. Tactics and doctrine should not focus on having the ability to lose more aircraft 
carriers because the nation can produce more numbers. That advantage fails if a potential 
enemy produces a large amount of anti-ship missiles. Viewing smaller aircraft carriers as 





The increase in drone technology gives the utility of aircraft carriers a possible 
challenge, and proponents of unmanned systems see long-range aircraft conducting 
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national tasking from land bases in the United States or in allied countries.159 While the 
technology incorporated in drones might grow to levels needed to accomplish this task, it 
is not there yet. Today drones are plagued with high crash rates, vulnerabilities from 
threats, requirements for clear airspace, and data connection issues, which jamming can 
sever. If the United States builds drones to conduct strikes autonomously a Tomahawk 
missile might provide a cheaper option. Missions could have devastating consequences if 
a scrubbed mission occurs due to a loss in data link, although, a human pilot might be as 
susceptible in the same instances. The cost of operating drones, compared to conventional 
aircraft, is not as beneficial as many think. Large support staffs and accidents are a few of 
the factors that drive up the cost. Also, the advantages that drones provide the United 
States in the war on terrorism against third world groups, are not likely to be as 
successful against more advanced foes. Moreover, others fear that the diminished 
repercussions, for no friendly pilot life is at stake, that a drone strike provides will make 
intervention too easily acceptable. The United States might more often involve itself in 
conflicts that result in blowback. The United States domination over drone technology 
will not last forever, and the proliferation of knowledge and equipment has already 
started to increase. Iran appears to have gained many details from crashed U.S. 
equipment. For now the Navy’s focus is to incorporate drones into the CVW, like the X-
47B Unmanned Combat Air System (UCLASS).160  
3. Submarines and Tomahawk Land Attack Missiles 
The U.S. submarine fleet and Tomahawk Land Attack Missiles (TLAMs) provide 
the United States with an enormous advantage over potential adversaries. In the opinion 
of Captain Henry Hendrix, who provides one of the most recent, well known arguments 
against aircraft carriers in his publication At What Cost a Carrier, and Dean of Naval 
Warfare Studies at the Naval War College Robert Rubel, these weapons offer a better 
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investment for America than naval aviation does both in monetary and utility terms. A 
submarine’s great advantage lies in its stealth capability and not many countries have the 
ability to detect U.S. submarines. The USS Virginia Class submarine and converted USS 
Ohio Class Cruise Missile Submarines (SSGNs) have a substantial strike capability with 
the incorporation of TLAMs and their traditional ability to attack surface and other 
subsurface targets.161 At approximately $2 million apiece and a range of roughly 900nm, 
TLAMs can safely deliver munitions without risking a pilot’s life.162 The newest Block 
IV Tomahawk missiles even have the ability to loiter over an area awaiting call down, 
relay imagery back to commanders, and store 15 preprogramed targets or accept a new 
GPS target via satellite data.163 According to Captain Hendrix, the 33 percent sortie 
increase rate advantage that the USS Gerald R. Ford (CVN-78) provides is not worth the 
94 percent increase in cost.164 He calculates that only 20 percent of a $120 million F-18 
Hornet’s airframe life will be spent in a combat zone. Using unclassified data to build his 
case, he estimates that 16,000 air to ground weapons were used in the Afghanistan and 
Iraq wars by Navy fighters, which equates to each aircraft only dropping 16 weapons.165 
In this case Tomahawks would be advantageous in monetary terms. He does 
acknowledges the need for man pilots for close air support, but believes that the military 
could develop cheaper means could handle most targets.166 
However, submarines and TLAMs, which surface vessels can also launch, cannot 
accomplish all of the mission set of naval aircraft, such as the ability to conduct and 
provide consistent reliable close air support, interdiction, many forms of visual 
identification, combat search and rescue (CSAR), surface search, enhanced airborne 
                                                 
161 Harry Kazianis, “Is AirSea Battle Obsolete?” The Diplomat, June 21, 2012, 
http://thediplomat.com/2012/06/is-airsea-battle-obsolete/; Rubel, “The Navy’s Changing Force Paradigm,” 
17-18, 22.  
162 “Tomahawk,” Naval Air Systems Command, U.S. Navy, accessed March 26, 2014, 
http://www.navair.navy.mil/index.cfm?fuseaction=home.display&key=F4E98B0F-33F5-413B-9FAE-
8B8F7C5F0766. 
163 Ibid.  
164 Hendrix, At What Cost a Carrier?, 6.  
165 Ibid., 7.  
166 Ibid., 3. 
 53 
intelligence surveillance and reconnaissance, humanitarian assistance, deep inland attack 
aided by air refueling and detachment locations, and continued mission support when 
data links are severed. Deterrence is also one of the largest missions that aircraft carriers 
perform, and stealthy submarines prefer to remain undetected. Like Taiwan in 1996, the 
United States has avoided many conflicts by parking an aircraft carrier off a potential 
adversary’s coast. In addition, just because adversarial ASW capability is currently not 
strong does not mean that countries will not invest great efforts to negate the U.S. 
submarine advantage.  
D. CHALLENGES POSED BY ADVERSARIES’ CAPABILITY  
Budgetary constraints, political wrangling, and the threat of elimination from 
other U.S. assets are not the only problems that vex the future of the carrier fleet. For 
decades aircraft carriers have operated freely offshore from warzones with limited fear of 
attack to the actual vessel. CSGs have not taking these advantages for granted and the 
Navy devotes money, manpower, and time to provide advanced ship defense, radar, and 
early warning aircraft. It also conducts pre deployment exercises to prepare crews for 
worse case scenarios, like under sea warfare exercises (USWEX) that improve ASW 
fortification. However, many view the advances in adversarial technology as proficient 
carrier killers, and they call for an investment in other military equipment. 
1. Contested Operational Areas and Carrier Limitations 
In Captain Hendrix’s opinion improvements in anti-ship and aircraft missile 
technology, like the Chinese built DF-21D that has a range twice that of current carrier 
aircraft, and investments in quiet diesel submarines make the U.S. Navy’s aircraft carrier 
fleet unable to operate in a contested environment and otherwise irrelevant. Although 
Captain Hendrix acknowledges the diplomatic power that a CSG can have sitting off a 




of long-range anti-ship missiles.167 With the estimated price of one Chinese DF-21D anti-
ship being five to eleven million dollars, China could build 1227 DF-21Ds for the cost of 
one aircraft carrier.168  
In Robert Rubel’s publications The Navy’s Changing Force Paradigm and The 
Future of Aircraft Carriers, Rubel shares Captain Hendrix’s view and also focuses 
mainly on the difficulty aircraft carriers would have with a Chinese opponent. Rubel, 
however, takes a slightly different approach when making his argument. He disagrees 
that the traditional broad labels of sea control and power projection correctly describe 
how carriers have supported naval doctrine over the years. Instead he identifies six more 
specific roles that aircraft carriers have provided: eyes of the fleet, developed from the 
early day of scouting enemy ships; cavalry, hit-and-run style tactics used during the 
opening portions of World War II in battles like Midway; capital ship, a carriers ability to 
rule supreme on the seas; nuclear-strike platform; airfield at sea, when the carrier can 
operate without a threat; and geopolitical chess piece, where the United States uses 
carriers as a show of force.169 In his opinion submarines support the eyes of the fleet and 
nuclear roles more efficiently. The TLAM overtook the cavalry position. A carrier can 
act as a capital ship only if it has a superior advantage over threatening missiles and a 
large amount of room to operate, but a good defense that keeps carriers from conducting 
strikes can act as a mission kill. The roles of airfield at sea and geopolitical chess piece 
are still around but will erode with development of friendly and potential enemy 
technology. Rubel believes that a carrier’s long life span will outlast their utility. He 
admits, however, that new roles may emerge for carriers, and the members of naval 
aviation have been good at developing ways to incorporate themselves into the nation’s 
battles and deterrence force.170 
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Professor Jake Douglas agrees that aircraft carriers would suffer in a war with 
China. He concludes that the U.S. forces would have a difficult battle in the Western 
Pacific, even considering the America’s advantage with long-range bombers, submarines, 
and surface combatants, due to China’s vast territory and extensive arsenal. Using 
PACOM Commander Admiral Locklear’s testimony as evidence, he argues that the Navy 
will continue to deploy carriers in dangerous areas, like the seas nearest to China, despite 
vulnerabilities, because it has little option otherwise. He admits that one-day 
countermeasure and UAV technology may protect the carrier from threats, but for now 
the Navy plays a dangerous game and risks the death of a carrier and its crew.171 
Ronald O’Rourke takes a different approach when viewing China’s military 
buildup. His report entitled China Naval Modernization: Implications for U.S. Navy 
Capabilities sees a weakened U.S. Navy as fuel to strengthen China’s naval ambitions. 
He argues for improved defenses against countering weapons, like the untested DF-21D, 
instead of retiring naval equipment. The DF-21 is not the first weapon in the history of 
naval aviation that threatened it, and the United States found defenses against those 
weapons.172 Also, the analogy of a carrier being a sitting duck is not correct. The carrier 
is only as strong as the platforms the United States puts on it and the long lifespan of 
carriers proves that constant updates, including defensive systems, can eliminate threats. 
New Laser Weapon systems (LaWS) like the Free Electron Laser might soon 
protect ships form anti-ship ballistic missiles. Lasers provide the advantage of reduced 
cost for each shot taken, have a large magazine, and work against highly maneuverable 
targets. However, lasers are still constrained by line of sight, atmospheric limitations, and 
thermal blooming or the scattered of light particles.173 The Navy’s effective ASW 
capability can help reduce the threats to the carrier from quiet submarines as long as the 
United States maintains a lead and continues investing in new technology.  
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David Barno, Nora Bensahel, and M. Thomas Davis’s publication The Carrier Air 
Wing of the Future express their belief that if the Navy willingly moves away from large 
deck carriers the United States will have to live with negative strategic implications for 
years to come. Constructing a force capability like naval aviation takes years to assemble 
and cannot be rebuilt quickly. A majority of the effort originates from the need to teach a 
pilot how to launch and recover on a pitching flight deck, training that takes years and 
improves with mentoring from pilots with experience. The decisions made in the 2015 
Future Years Defense Program (FYDP), which may cut CVN-73, will have lasting effects 
on subsequent FYDPs, programs, and proficiencies.174 Former Navy Secretary Donald 
Winter believes that DC leadership remains too focused on short-term goals, and the 
United States must fight the GWoT and not forget future battles and requirements. Efforts 
to save money today may have greater consequences down the road, and reductions in 
ship procurement might cost skills in shipbuilding. He does agree with a critic’s point 
that change is rapid, and ships’ long life cycles present challenges as equipment can 
become outdated.175  
China believes in the utility of the aircraft carrier as it has started construction on 
its second one, which will be China’s first attempt at building one indigenously, and the 
PLAN wants four by 2020.176 China’s first carrier, the Liaoning, became operational in 
2013 and has aircraft weight issues for its 22 J-15 aircraft. Currently, the U.S. Navy does 
not see a threat to its supremacy from China’s carriers due to weak ASW proficiency.177 
With increases in technology this could change. While a CSG may suffer in a battle near 
China’s boarders, a strong naval capability, including carriers, may keep China’s 
ambitions in check outside the range of a DF-21D.  
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2. Arms Sales  
Critics provide powerful points in their discussions of threats against a CSG, 
however, many of them only focus on China as a potential adversary and forget the utility 
that aircraft carriers provide the United States with the other nations in the world that do 
not have the ability to oppose an operating CSG. However, this advantage might also 
fluctuate in opposition against carriers.  
The proliferation of anti-ship/anti-aircraft weapons in smaller nations may pose a 
greater threat to aircraft carriers than larger countries do, as a CSG might not maintain the 
same defensive levels, which make operations more difficult and dangerous, when 
patrolling near a perceived less threatening country. Also, countries with less military 
power may not have to fear the loss of economic relations with the United States in 
retaliation for an attack. China saw a 162 percent increase in weapons exports from 2008 
to 2012.178 The top four countries that receive Chinese military export are Pakistan, 
Bangladesh, Bolivia, and Vietnam, and even NATO member Turkey purchased an air 
defense system. Many more countries might soon possess systems like the DF-21D, 
expanding dangerous zones for carriers.179  
Jonathan Caverley and Ethan Kapstein see America’s pursuit of expensive high 
tech military hardware, like the JSF, as a source of decline for U.S. arms exports. Many 
former customers now choose less expensive and less technical defense articles from 
countries like Russia and China.180 In Caverley and Kapstein’s view U.S. exports have 
acted as a tool of foreign policy and kept many states on America’s side. The shift to 
pricy equipment began with the increased defense spending in support of OEF and OIF. 
They believe that smaller and cheaper and less advanced equipment can meet the needs 
of national security and bring customers back.181  
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3. Asymmetric Warfare 
Another type of threat to carriers is asymmetric warfare. Although irregular 
warfare was not a new concept, the assault on the USS Cole (DDG 67) highlighted the 
increased shift of America’s adversaries to it and the threat to aircraft carriers. Attacking 
a CSG with multiple small suicide boats filled with explosives can provide just as 
effective a means of damaging or destroying a ship as a DF-21 or other anti-ship missile. 
Having a large concentration of manpower and equipment on a carrier makes it a high 
visibility target for such attacks. Iran has spent many years perfecting tactics that involve 
small boat attacks. These maneuvers might shut down important trade routes like the 
Persian Gulf. Non-state actors also find asymmetric warfare appealing and retaliation for 
the United States would prove difficult.182  
4. Upgrades to Overcome Threats 
There are upgrades and improvements that might assist naval aviation in 
developing an ability to overcome threats and maintain a high combat effectiveness. 
Some advantages and capabilities were lost as aircraft with specific mission sets 
integrated into multi-mission platforms. A cohesive data link sharing systems like the 
tactical targeting network technology (TTNT), which works with Link-16 Joint Tactical 
Information Distribution System (JTIDS) and Naval Integrated Fire Control-Counter Air 
(NIFC-CA), could integrate capabilities from the Navy’s vast selection of systems 
making long range cooperative targeting possible and increasing situational awareness.183 
As the Navy strives to data link all units, these systems need a vast anti-jam capacity 
backed up with redundancy. With an increased intelligence capability commanders have 
the ability to disseminate data faster and relay intentions more effectively and clearly.184  
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An upgrade in aircraft range and defensive capability and coordination would also 
serve naval aviation well. Today’s carrier air wing is designed to operate within 200nm 
from a target area. With the threat of DF-21D pushing the carrier out to 900nm or more 
strike packages would have difficulty making the long range without air refueling and 
would likely encounter capable surface–to-air missiles (SAM) threats as widely 
proliferated, modern SAM’s effective range has also increased disproportionate to carrier 
aircraft. To contest these increasing hazards the Navy made efforts to upgrade the 
electronic support and warfare performance of the EA-18G Growler and add active 
electronically scanned array (AESA) radar to the E-2D Hawkeye. The F-35’s combat 
radius of 600nm does improve the situation slightly and future unmanned systems would 
also help.185 The Navy plans on having six operational test X-47B UCLASS by 2020 that 
possibly could conduct mission in strike, intelligence surveillance and reconnaissance, 
tanking, jamming, and missile carrier (missile truck).186 With increased cooperation with 
the Air Force, submarines, surface platforms, and the cyber community, naval aviation 
could systematically whittle away defensive systems and clear air corridors with jamming 
and anti-radiation weapons in order to conduct coordinated attacks.187 
E. MISSION USE 
1. Non-core Mission Use  
An aircraft carrier’s versatility to accomplish both core and non-core missions 
makes it a popular choice with both military and civilian leadership. The wide variety of 
tasks that an aircraft carrier can perform provides backing, which reinstates importance 
and value, but it also hinders combat effectiveness. RAND Corporation’s publication 
Leveraging America’s Aircraft Carrier Capabilities examines both combat and 
noncombat, traditional and nontraditional ways that aircraft carriers have supported and 
could possible support national interest. The researchers conclude that the United States 
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will use aircraft carriers more often to provide non-core mission support.188 For 
noncombat roles a carrier excels as it can produce 400,000 gallons of fresh water daily, 
does not need to refuel for 23 years, can transport a large amount of supplies and 
equipment, and carries 90 days of self-sustaining provisions.189 The authors advocate the 
mission and call for an increase in aircraft vertical lift capacity. In an opposite view, 
Captain Robert Watts’s essay The New Normalcy observes the Navy’s involvement in the 
non-core mission of humanitarian aid as detrimental to combat readiness and he questions 
the usefulness of aircraft carriers providing such support. He believes the ship and crew 
lose out on combat readiness, surge capability, and maintenance, which can negatively 
impacts the ship’s lifespan. There are many recent examples where carriers left normal 
deterrence patrols to provide aid such as the USS George Washington (CVN-73) during 
the 2013 Philippine typhoon relief operation and the USS Ronald Reagan (CVN-76) after 
the Japanese 2011 tsunami. The Navy shows no sign of moving away from this 
mission.190 The Ford class even offers a design that increases the ability to switch 
mission sets. Not all non-standard missions are humanitarian in nature. USS Kitty Hawk 
(CV-63) converted into a special ops platform during the opening stages of OEF.191  
2. Core Mission Use 
Traditional aircraft carrier mission use in OEF and OIF also hurt combat 
effectiveness, and the Navy’s grasp on public support waned due to the focus on land 
wars. Dave Majumdar and Sam LaGrone remarked that fighting in Iraq and Afghanistan 
degraded naval aviation’s ability to fight a sophisticated enemy.192 In those wars the vast 
majority of missions required pilots only to drop bombs and conduct close air support, 
which relaxed combat efficiency in anti-air warfare.193 Seth Cropsey, author of The U.S. 
Navy In Distress, agrees and adds that the Navy could only deal with the battles through 
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changing the FRP and PERSTEMPO, which over stress ships, aircraft, and crew. An 
example is the increase in depot level maintenance of F-18 Hornets due to heavy flight 
hours while supporting GWoT. He also believes that OEF and OIF lowered the Navy’s 
strategic vision, and the Navy suffered a loss of public’s support due to the focus on land 
wars, affecting congressional backing and funding.194 With the budget decrease, the 
Navy will likely see a 20 percent decrease in the ship building numbers over the next 15-
20 years.195 Cropsey states that the slogan “A Global Force for Good” properly portrayed 
the Navy’s attitude of focusing on humanitarian assistance missions and playing a 
subsidiary role in land campaigns while forgetting about the importance of maintaining 
maritime strength and preparing for challenges like China.196 
Although using aircraft carriers and naval aviation on both the core and non-core 
missions can hinder combat effectiveness and equipment lifespan, it provides the United 
States with a great return on investment. Any real world mission use displays the true 
versatility of a carrier and allows the members of naval aviation an opportunity to exhibit 
their skills at adaptability to accomplish missions. Crew morale often surges when 
responsibilities net real world positive results. However, the Navy needs to establish a 
balance to prevent overburdening the crew. Humanitarian assistance builds partnerships 
with other nations that may provide greater deterrence than gunboat diplomacy does. 
Harder tasks could lie ahead, and the government should continue to fund pre deployment 
exercises like Air Wing Fallon and routine unit level training, which help pilots maintain 
core proficiencies. The reduction in flight hours while squadrons are in the home cycle 
endangers the health of naval aviation more than participation in crisis and land 
campaigns.  
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F. CONCLUSIONS 
Critics of aircraft carriers cite the cost, force composition, alternatives, utility, and 
vulnerabilities as reasons to invest in other defense technologies. However, aircraft 
carriers provide the United States with a strong, conventional, and creditable ability to 
protect America’s worldwide commitment and conduct contingency operations, and 
naval aviation possesses advantages that other technologies do not. Vulnerabilities do 
exist, as they do in all systems, and future technologies might oppose naval aviation more 
effectively. Although these challenges are difficult, aircraft carriers possess the ability to 
be easily upgraded with the newest defensive systems. Other issues such as mission use 
and manpower shortages hinder the combat effectiveness of naval aviation, and changes 
to OPTEMPO would help ensure that the carrier force remains at levels needed both in 
terms of manning and force strength. The versatile power that the carrier fleet possesses 
in multiple mission areas takes years to build and perfect, and a major decrease in ship 
construction and training would take an extended time to replace. Uncertainty has not left 
the world. With China and Russia’s efforts to increase military and political power and 
COCOM hefty requirements, the United States should not harm naval aviation with 
further reductions in numbers. Shortsightedness is not an option if America remains 
committed to unquestionable self-defense and allied protection. The aircraft carrier has 
repeatedly answered the nations call for support and can remain a part of America’s 
strategic future for decades to come. 
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V. CONCLUSIONS  
Many consider naval aviation as an ace in the nation’s deck of cards, and for over 
70 years, it has remained a staple of American maritime strength. Naval aircraft and 
aircraft carriers possess an ability to accomplish a plethora of missions in humanitarian, 
deterrence, and combat roles. A look at the history of naval aviation reveals insight into 
how the Navy might deal with an attack against its autonomy and how the U.S. Navy 
developed institutional interest in naval aviation. If the U.S. government attempted a 
major reduction in the aircraft carrier fleet would naval leadership stand up publicly in 
protest as they did in the late 1940s? The strong passions in support for naval aviation 
still exist in various groups in the military, civilian government, and public/business. 
However, strong military support for naval aviation was not seen in the 2014 
consideration not to refuel the USS George Washington (CVN-73), contrasting with the 
’40s. The majority of efforts to protect the carrier fleet emerged from a strong legislative 
uproar, instead of the Navy. The Navy acted dangerously, if Wall Street Journal writer 
Julian Barnes’ thoughts are correct that the Navy proposed the carrier cuts only to appear 
tough while knowing that Congress would not approve them since it was an election 
year.197  
Many of the historical administrative and budgetary decisions made in naval 
aviation’s past, such as the creation of OP-03V and ship construction plans, still have 
consequences and influences for naval aviation’s modern role and structure. The 
enormous life span of naval vessels, which can reach more than 50 years for aircraft 
carriers, requires the Navy to develop strategies that incorporate weapon systems bought 
under much different past strategic environments. The ability to upgrade carriers and 
aircraft help naval aviation systems stay relevant to the force requirements. Also, the 
Navy often seeks policies that support the established institutional interest, which is set 
by a select group inside the organization and ingrained in the culture. Consequently, there 
exist the possibility for a weapon system to receive funding even when the strategic 
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environment does not support it, and national interest becomes confused with the pursuit 
of influence. The historical example of the United States’ commitment to the battleship 
serves as a reminder of the dangers of these actions.198 Finding a delicate balance 
between interest and needs can present challenges. America might have only fought 
specific types of battles because resources were tied up in the support of particular 
weapon systems, and the military might be unprepared for certain types of fights. 
In addition to institutional interest, the Navy’s commitment to strike warfare and 
A2AD, the adaptability of naval aviation’s systems and technologies, and the U.S. 
government’s commitment to oversea interests, meant that naval aviation received 
support at the conclusion of the Cold War even without a major advisory. The backing 
naval aviation received allowed it to play critical roles, which were unexpected to many 
critics, in OEF and OIF. The ability of the members of naval aviation to develop new 
tactics and procedures to keep naval aircraft employed made vital contributions to 
national defense. While America’s mentality toward liberal internationalism and 
protection of its worldwide commitment may one day change, the Obama’s 
administration relies heavily on the capability of a strong carrier fleet in foreign policy.  
Although the United States has more carriers than all other nations combined, no 
other country has the same worldwide commitment that America does. Free trading 
nations depend on the United States to maintain freedom of navigation on the seas and 
security stability. At times COCOMs, like PACOM’s Admiral Locklear, have express 
concerns over the current carrier fleet’s size to meet mission tasking. The amount of 
carriers is not the only problem vexing maritime security. The Navy has made it a habit 
to lower FRP and PERSTEMPO standards to continually accept tasks that negatively 
impact manning and material readiness.199 A large portion of naval personnel even 
supported the land forces in augmentee roles. Without a decrease in mission use, a loss of 
capability will occur. The Navy cannot retain the same structure ability with less, unless a 
new technology emerges that can make a strategic change. Reductions in deployment 
cycles and operating cost could occur if the United States military undertook realistic 
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cooperation with allied nations as the 2014 QDR outlines. Countries like the United 
Kingdom and Australia could assist in power projection, taking a lot of the strain off of 
the U.S. Navy.200 Getting the American military, public, and government to place their 
security in the hands of someone else is not something that will be simple. However, if 
America desires to maintain the same maritime ability with increased budget cuts, 
cooperation can help and build stronger alliances.  
Knowing when the aircraft carrier and naval aviation has reached the end of its 
utility is going to be a difficult task for the United States, but it has not happened yet. The 
carrier may still be relevant even if the loss of a CSG occurs, as many successful weapon 
systems suffer combat defeats. Although many fear that new carriers like the USS Ford 
(CVN-78) will outlive usefulness, naval aviation can maintain relevance well into the 
future with support and upgrades. However, an aircraft carrier is only as strong as the 
systems the United States puts on it. While critics cite the dangers that China poses to an 
aircraft carrier, supporters of naval aviation mention the effectiveness of defensive 
systems and the ability of naval aviation to restrain Chinese and other countries’ maritime 
ambitions. For now aircraft carriers provide the United States with a strong, creditable, 
and conventional ability to accomplish America’s worldwide commitment and conduct 
contingency operations, and naval aviation possesses advantages that other technologies 
do not. The opportunistic cost of naval aviation has yet to exceed its utility. 
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